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THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE AND OFFICIAL
PRESSURE TO PARTICIPATE IN ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMOUS
Paul E. Salamanca*
[F]or an hour it was deadly dull, and I was fidgety. Miss Watson
would say, "Dont put your feet up there, Huckleberry;" and
"dont scrunch up like that, Huckleberry-set up straight;" and
pretty soon she would say, "Don't gap and stretch like that,
Huckleberry-why don't you try to behave?" Then she told me
all about the bad place, and I said I wished I was there. She got
mad, then, but I didn't mean no harm. All I wanted was to go
somewheres; all I wanted was a change, I warn't particular. She
said it was wicked to say what I said; said she wouldn't say it for
the whole world; she was going to live so as to go to the good
place. Well, I couldn't see no advantage in going where she was
going, so I made up my mind I wouldn't try for it. But I never
said so, because it would only make trouble, and wouldn't do
no good.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A healthy dose of anticlericalism runs through American cul-
ture, but religion is not necessarily a trivial thing. In fact, nonle-
gal scholars have argued that religion, as a psychological phe-
nomenon, is an essential attribute of the human experience. 2 If
they are correct, the emergence of modem, positive government
creates a dilemma. As ostensibly secular government comes to
dominate such classic domains of religion as education,
medicine, and charity, people have less exposure to religion as a
metaphor for psychological development, and the metaphor they
* Paul E. Salamanca, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of
Law. I would like to thank Ron Adelman, Richard Ausness, John Garvey, Marc Jefferson,
Jennifer Philpot, John Rogers, Peter Spiro, and John Witte for reading drafts of this Ar-
ticle. This Article is based in part on an essay prepared for the 1996 Kentucky Bar
Convention.
1. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN, in 2 THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 44 (Ronald Gottesman et al. eds., 1979).
2. See, e.g., 18 C.G. JUNG, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG 692, at 289 (Sir
Herbert Read et al. eds., 1955) (hereinafter JUNG, C.W.) ("There is no conflict between
religion and science . . . [s]cience has to consider what there is. There is religion, and
it is one of the most essential manifestations of the human mind."). See infra notes 261-
73 and accompanying text.
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do have may be deficient.3 However, if it will not suffice for the
proper development of the religious side of human nature for
government to adopt an utterly neutral position toward. religion,
4
the question arises whether there are ways in which government
can incorporate religion 5 into its activities without compromising
the clarity of separationism and disestablishment.
Formal separation of church and state and modest accommo-
dation of religious development may not be categorically recon-
cilable,6 but they can and should be reconciled by a contextual
3. See infra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
4. Franklin I. Gamwell argues that such a position is not possible:
On either account [of the "privatist" view of religion, according to which
religion and politics should occupy discrete spheres of influence], the
meaning of religious freedom is so identified that it explicitly denies the
comprehensive order of reflection and, therefore, explicitly denies what
every religious adherent affirms, namely, that her or his conviction is valid.
Because neither account legitimates any religion, the privatist view is not a
coherent resolution of the modem political problematic [which seeks to
answer the question "What, if anything, is the proper relation between
politics and religion, given that the political community includes an inde-
terminate plurality of legitimate religions?"].
FRANKLIN I. GAMwELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN POLITICS AND THE
DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION 74-75 (1995).
If Gamwell is correct, government cannot exist without "establishing" religion in
some sense, unless, as Gamwell later argues, government constitutes itself by the ques-
tion "What is the best religion?" See infra note 6. It would therefore follow that govern-
ment would have some affirmative obligation to facilitate or accommodate religious
growth, because, if Gamwell is correct, government would be incapable of maintaining
strict neutrality on the issue.
5. Religion as religion, that is. The government has often depended, without consti-
tutional infirmity, upon religious entities to perform public services, but not in their ca-
pacity as religious entities. Thus, the government may authorize hospitals affiliated with
a particular denomination to care for the impoverished sick. See Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899) (upholding public aid to an explicitly Roman Catholic organization
that was limited by its own charter to the secular purpose of operating a hospital);
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (upholding the disbursement of federal funds
in trust to Catholic schools for the education of the Sioux); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988) (acknowledging that a public program designed to address teen pregnancy
could work through organizations with religious pedigrees, provided such organizations
are not "pervasively sectarian"). The question I am addressing here is whether the gov-
ernment may ever depend upon religion in its proper sense.
6. Gamwell argues that there is a solution to the "modern political problematic,"
which he expresses in the question "What, if anything, is the proper relation between
politics and religion, given that the political community includes an indeterminate plu-
rality of legitimate religions?" GAmwELL, supra note 4, at 5. Gamwell contends that this
problem can be resolved if the state constitutes itself by the comprehensive question,
that is, if it constitutes itself by the question "what makes human activity as such authen-
tic?" Id. at 24. Gamwell would thus resolve the tension I discuss in the text by making
the question "What is the best religion?" a central part of the democratic agenda.
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legal regime that mediates between the two.7 By such a regime, I
mean one that takes into account the psychological process by
which people come to embrace religious beliefs and principles.
In fact, Alan Schwarz argued that the United States Supreme
Court should, and generally does, pursue a nonformalist course
in resolving cases, maintaining that the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment "should be read to prohibit only aid which
has as its motive or substantial effect the imposition of religious
belief or practice; and that the Supreme Court's decisions and
much of its language are consistent with this proposed stan-
dard."8 Similarly, Justice O'Connor has advocated the kind of
contextual approach that I have described,9 and Justice Kennedy,
7. Indeed, Justice O'Connor has urged on at least two occasions that the Supreme
Court abandon its attachment to a single rule that applies in all instances in which the
Establishment Clause is invoked. See infra notes 9 and 240. Justice O'Connor's proposal
would necessarily lead to case-by-case or context-based analysis of claimed violations of
the Establishment Clause, at least until new general rules emerge. In the absence of a
single formalist rule, courts could adopt what might be referred to as an "impact-based
approach" to nonestablishment, which would be one based directly upon the process by
which people become religious or change their outlook in that regard. My interest in
this Article is primarily on this approach, which has been advocated by such scholars as
Alan Schwarz and Michael McConnell. See Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Es-
tablishment Clause Value, 77 YALE LJ. 692, 693 (1968); Michael W. McConnell, Accommoda-
tion of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 34-41. See infra notes 253-57 and accompanying
text. In practice, of course, this approach may lead to a generally applicable "meta-
rule," such as Schwarz's proposal that only official practices that have as their "motive
or substantial effect the imposition of religious belief or practice" be deemed to violate
the Establishment Clause. Schwarz, supra, at 693. The contextual nature of such a test,
as Schwarz concedes, would arise in its application. See id. ("[An imposition standard]
would not, however, provide automatic answers. For instance, the question whether pro-
viding textbooks to parochial schools or school children constitutes aid to a religious
function would not be dispositive, since aid to a religious function is constitutional so
long as no imposition results."). The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Schwarz, supra note 7, at 693. In Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1
(1947), for instance, the Supreme Court formally announced that under no circum-
stances may government aid religion. See id. at 15-16. Yet the Supreme Court went on to
uphold a local plan that, among other things, reimbursed parents for the costs of send-
ing their children to Catholic school by bus. See id. at 17.
9. Justice O'Connor has on several occasions called for a decentralization of Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When bedrock principles
collide, they test the limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of
a Grand Unified Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified."); Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[A]nother danger to keep in
mind is that the bad test may drive out the good. Rather than taking the opportunity to
derive narrower, more precise tests from the case law, courts tend to continually try to
patch up the broad test, making it more and more amorphous and distorted."); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Every government
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at least at one time, advocated an impact-based approach to
nonestablishment.10
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent decisions in such cases as
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia" and
Agostini v. Felton" may signal a shift, albeit implicit, to contextual
decision-making in the area of nonestablishment. Notwithstand-
ing these comments and trends, however, the Supreme Court's
leading articulated tests for the Establishment Clause still tend to
be formalist and, for the most part, separationist 3
Excessive attachment to separationism may not serve the polity
or all of its citizens well. Moreover, if religion is an innate aspect
practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes
an endorsement or disapproval of religion."). One of the most prominent of her pro-
posed alternatives to a "Grand Unified Theory" has been her "endorsement" test. See in-
fra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (reasoning that government
may neither coerce religious activity nor give benefits to the degree that it in fact estab-
lishes a religion). See supra note 7 for a discussion of what is meant by an impact-based
approach to nonestablishment.
11. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). For a discussion of Rosenberger see infra notes 189-227 and
accompanying text.
12. 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997). See infra note 227 for a brief discussion of Agostini.
13. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. The Supreme Court declared that:
The [Establishment Clause] means at least this: Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.... No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activi-
ties or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion.
Id. See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The Establishment Clause, unlike
the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."). Some-
what similarly, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court held that a law violates the Es-
tablishment Clause if its purpose is religious, if its primary effect is to promote or in-
hibit religion, or if it fosters excessive entanglements between church and state. 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971). The three-part "Lemon test" has often been recognized as the prevail-
ing test for applying the Establishment Clause.
Although a strong argument can be made-and often is made-that Lemon is dead,
see, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 795, 797 (1993),
the decision has not been overruled, and lower courts routinely apply it. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 307-08 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (upholding a require-
ment that a person convicted of a multiple offense for driving under the influence par-
ticipate in a county alcohol and drug education program as well as an "additional pro-
gram" that, because of logistics, was often A.A., on the grounds that the primary
purpose and effect of requiring attendance at an additional program was to combat
drunken driving, not to promote religion, that the requirement did not foster excessive
entanglements, and that at least one secular alternative to A.A., a program called "Ra-
tional Recovery," was available). In fact, the Supreme Court appeared to adhere to
Lemon in the recent case Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct 1997, 2010, 2014-15 (1997).
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of the human experience, it should not be surprising that Al-
coholics Anonymous (A.A.), a widely known and arguably relig-
ious support group for problem drinkers, has become a common
and effective means of combating alcoholism. Also, it should not
be surprising that probation officers, parole officers, judges, bar
overseers, wardens, and myriad others exercising state authority
routinely push individuals toward A.A. 14 Arguably, however, offi-
cial referral of problem drinkers to A.A. violates current interpre-
tations of the Establishment Clause because of the quasi-religious
nature of the program.1 5 Much of A.A. is functionally and textu-
ally "religious" in the broad sense of the word. For example,
many A.A. meetings conclude with a prayer. Moreover, the first
three of A.A.'s "Twelve Steps" provide, respectively, that "We ad-
mitted we were powerless over alcohol-that our lives had be-
come unmanageable," 16 that "[we c]ame to believe that a Power
greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity,"17 and that "[we
m]ade a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care
of God as we understood Him."8 Accordingly, one might wonder
whether, under current doctrine, a state or local government vio-
lates the Establishment Clause when it requires a person con-
victed of driving under the influence to attend A.A. meetings as
a condition of probation,19 whether a state may require prisoners
to attend A.A. meetings as a condition of incarceration, 20 or
14. See infra notes 287-92 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 316-23 and accompanying text.
16. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADI-
TIONS 21 (1952) (hereinafter TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADMONS).
17. See id. at 25.
18. See id. at 34 (emphasis original). In the forward to this book, the authors write:
"The basic principles of A.A., as they are known today, were borrowed mainly from the
fields of religion and medicine, though some ideas upon which success finally depended
were the result of noting the behavior and needs of the Fellowship itself." See id. at 16.
19. See O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (municipal
court ordered individual convicted of a multiple driving under the influence offense to
attend either A.A. or "Rational Recovery" meetings as a condition of probation);
Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1070 (2d Cir. 1997) (mu-
nicipal court, upon the recommendation of a county department of probation, required
individual convicted of a third alcohol-related driving offense to attend AA. meetings as
a condition of probation). The Second Circuit may have vacated the cited opinion in
Warner, see Orange County Dep't of Probation v. Warner, 968 F. Supp. 917, 918 n.1 (S.D.N.Y
1997) (mem.), but the underlying facts seem accurate, as they reflect the facts set forth
in earlier district court decisions. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probation,
870 F. Supp. 69, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
20. See Stafford v. Harrison, 766 R Supp. 1014, 1015-16 (D. Kan. 1991) (inmate's in-
carceration continued for "poor progress" in prison program based on A.A.); see also
Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 100 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997)
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whether a state may refuse to reinstate the driver's license of an
individual who has been convicted of driving while intoxicated
for his failure to participate in a "support system" for problem
drinkers. 21 Given the extensive interaction between regulatory
and penal authorities, on the one hand, and A.A. or groups
based upon A.A., on the other, these questions can have
profound consequences. More to the point, if we as a society ap-
preciate this interaction and what it accomplishes, then either
the Supreme Court has misinterpreted the Establishment Clause,
the Establishment Clause itself reflects shortsighted judgment, or
we have to live with the effects of uncontrolled alcoholism. Ar-
guably, the most desirable conclusion would be that the Su-
preme Court has misinterpreted the Establishment Clause. Oth-
erwise, a monolithic interpretation of the Constitution may
preclude an effective response to an admitted scourge.
Although separationism helps both church and state, our Con-
stitution does, and should, permit some dialogue between the
two, not in the sense of permanent, open-ended connections,
but in the sense of minute, almost case-specific accommodations
that reflect the close fit between human nature and religion. To
support this argument, I point out in Part II of this Article that a
variety of somewhat inconsistent sentiments underlay the Relig-
ion Clauses22 at the time of their adoption and that one of these
sentiments was a desire to protect authentic, private religious
growth, with or without officially established religion.23 Although
this may not be apparent from modem interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, it follows readily from the fact that many of
the people who originally supported the First Amendment also
supported established religions in their home states. The Estab-
lishment Clause only prevented Congress from establishing a re-
ligion.24 Given this predicate, an interpretation is faithful to
(state inmate's eligibility for "Family Reunion Program" conditioned upon participation
in a program based upon the Twelve Steps of A.A.).
21. See Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 895-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
22. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses together provide that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
24. Cf. Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 589, 609 (1845) (addressing
the argument that a law of the State of Louisiana might violate the Free Exercise
Clause) ("The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respec-
tive states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws: nor is
there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on
the states."). SeeJay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5,
1098 [Vol. 65
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much, if not most, of the original intent of the Clauses if it pre-
serves the freedom of the individual to grow along authentic re-
ligious lines, irrespective of the state's position on religion. A
contrary interpretation would have to ignore much of that origi-
nal intent.25 In this Part, I also note that the history of the
United States-especially the early history-contains abundant
examples of nondenominational "establishments" by the federal
government, as well as both nondenominational and overtly de-
nominational establishments by the states. This, I note, lends fur-
ther support to the argument that the Establishment Clause did
not originally focus upon strict separation. 26
In Part III, I discuss modem Establishment Clause doctrine, fo-
cusing on the formal, separationist dictum of Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewinge7 and the relatively formalist, three-part test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman, under which a law is unconstitutional if its
purpose or primary effect is to promote or inhibit religion or if
it fosters excessive entanglements between church and state.28 I
argue in this Part that Lemon, Everson, and similar decisions have
not succeeded in resolving the ambiguity created by the foun-
ders. In fact, as I argue in this Part, the Supreme Court's failure
to produce and to adhere to a coherent separationist interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause-or any formalist interpretation
of that provision--demonstrates the deficiency of such rules.
In Part IV, I discuss with approval some of the contextual ap-
proaches to the Establishment Clause that have been advocated
- by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and by such commentators as
Alan Schwarz and Michael McConnell. 29 Drawing on nonlegal
sources, I also suggest in this Part that, as a psychological and
theological matter, formal separationist rules may compromise
important principles of religious freedom and disserve at least
some portions of the populace.30 I conclude in this Part that the
and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 48 VAND. L REv. 1539, 1556-60 (1995) (describing
the First Amendment as "a subject matter disability").
25. See Scott C. Idleman, Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics and American Constitu-
tionalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 991, 996-97 (1996) (reviewing ISSAC KRAMNICK & R. LAu-
RENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS
(1996)) ("[T]he notion that among the Framers, or even the principal framers, there
was a strong, unitary consensus about the godlessness of the Constitution, let alone the
godlessness of the derivative political order, seems much too simplistic.").
26. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
27. See 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
28. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
29. See infra notes 240-57 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 261-83 and accompanying text.
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Establishment Clause is best implemented by a contextual ap-
proach to the proper relationship between church and state and
that a law should be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause
only if it interferes with authentic religious development or if it
actually constitutes sponsorship of a denomination. After making
this claim, I then discuss A.A. in Part V, arguing that, although it
sufficiently resembles a religion to trigger the Establishment
Clause, the government ought to be able to incorporate A.A.
into its activities, albeit with some limitations, without running
afoul of the Constitution.31 I then apply my analysis concerning
A.A. to several court decisions in which the issue has been
presented.
II. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Various Schools
The framers of the Religion Clauses were not of a single mind
concerning the meaning of religious freedom. In fact, John
Witte argues that there were at least four overlapping schools of
thought concerning the appropriate relationship between relig-
ion and government prevailing in the late Eighteenth Century.
He describes these schools as those of "congregational Puritans,"
"free church evangelicals," "civic republicans," and "enlighten-
ment thinkers."3 2 As the names suggest, the first two arose from
religious beliefs, and the second two from political beliefs.
According to Witte, the Puritan school was characterized by a
belief that church and government were discrete, yet mutually
supportive, means of securing the kingdom of God on earth.
Thus, for the Puritans, church and state were formally separated
for the sake of efficiency and effectiveness, but not out of a be-
31. See infra note 325 and accompanying text.
32. See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Con-
stitutional Experiment, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 377 (1996) (emphasis removed). As
Witte writes:
These four views-Puritan, evangelical, enlightenment, and republican-
helped to inform the early American experiment in religious rights and lib-
erties. Each view was liberally espoused by federal and state leaders in the
early American republic, informally in their letters and pamphlets, and for-
mally in the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates. Each left
indelible marks in the documents and developments of early American
constitutionalism.
See id. at 388.
1100 [Vol. 65
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lief that the two were unrelated.33 For them, the separation of
church and state was much like the "separation" of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers within a government--official, im-
portant, and healthy, but by no means absolute. Just as Congress
and the President play separate roles in creating laws, yet ulti-
mately work together to do so (except in the instance of an over-
ride), the Puritans expected church and state to work together
to build the "Citty vpon a Hill."34 In contrast to the Puritans, the
evangelicals, who had historically been mistreated by the Puritan
religion and other established religions,35 called for a fairly com-
plete division between temporal and spiritual authority.36 In fact,
Roger Williams, an evangelical preacher who had been banished
from one of the early Puritan colonies in Massachusetts, first re-
sorted to the metaphor of a "wall" between church and state.37
Civic republicans, adherents to one of the two political schools
of thought, believed that there ought to be some intercourse be-
tween church and state, holding that a stable, healthy democracy
required a modicum of education and virtue in the citizenry that
only religion could produce.38 Many Puritans, such as John Ad-
ams,39 were adherents to this school as well, but the civic republi-
can school also included such southerners as George Washing-
ton.40 The enlightenment school, on the other hand, of which
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, and
Thomas Paine were noteworthy exponents, opposed intercourse
between religion and politics on both theological and nontheo-
logical grounds. Their theological opposition arose from the
33. See id. at 378-79 ("[The Puritans] conceived of the church and the state as two
separate covenental associations, two seats of Godly authority in the community. Each
institution, they believed, was vested with a distinct polity and calling.").
34. See JOHN WINTHROP, CHRISTIAN CHARITEE: MODELL HEREOF (1630), reprinted in
JOHN T. NOONAN. JR.. THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE: CASES, HISTORY, AND
OTHER DATA BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 64 (1987) ("[Flor
wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty vpon a Hill.") (editor's note omitted).
35. See NOONAN, supra note 34, at 94-96 (discussing the persecution of Separate Bap-
tists in colonial Virginia, a practice that irritated James Madison).
36. See Witte, supra note 32, at 386.
37. Williams called for a "wall of Separation between the Garden of the Church
and the Wilderness of the world." See Witte, supra note 32, at 381 (quoting ROGER W11.
LIAMS, MR. COTTONS LETTER LATELY PRINTED, EXAMINED AND ANSWERED (1644), reprinted in
1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 392 (1963)) The Baptist preacher John
Leland was more emphatic: "The notion of a Christian commonwealth should be ex-
ploded forever." See Witte, supra note 32, at 382 (quoting JOHN LELAND, THE WRITINGS OF
THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 118 (1845)).
38. See Witte, supra note 32, at 386. See also McConnell, supra note 7, at 17-19.
39. See Witte, supra note 32, at 378, 385.
40. See id. at 385.
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high value they placed on the power of reason, which they per-
ceived as a means of freeing the human mind from centuries of
dogmatic thought. In addition, many enlightenment thinkers ad-
vocated strict separationism in order to liberate the state from
religious interference.41 Because of a congruence of goals, there
was some sympathy between the religious evangelical school and
the political enlightenment school, and these two groups tended
to be the strongest proponents of a strict separation of church
and state.
According to Witte, each of these schools had a number of ad-
herents, and no school was excluded from the discourse.42 More-
over, Witte argues that the ideas espoused by adherents of these
schools were sufficiently influential in the postrevolutionary pe-
riod to justify the conclusion that the founders "incorporated"
them into the Religion Clauses.43 Consequently, any distillation
of the intentions originally underlying the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses must acknowledge at least two disparate,
and perhaps even logically irreconcilable, approaches to religious
freedom--one contemplating strict separation, and another con-
templating a moderate level of association between church and
state. For this reason, it would be no more faithful to the inten-
tions originally underlying the Religion Clauses to adopt the
41. See id. at 383 ("The primary purpose of enlightenment writers was political, not
theological. They sought not only to free religion and the church from the interference
of politics and the state, as did the evangelicals, but, more importantly, to free politics
and the state from the intrusion of religion and the church.").
42. See id. at 378.
43. See id. at 404. Witte writes:
Indeed, it might not be too strong to say that the "first incorporation" of
religious rights and liberties was engineered not by the Supreme Court in
the 1940s when it incorporated the religion clauses into the due process
clause, but by the First Congress in 1789 when it drafted the First Amend-
ment religion clauses. This "first incorporation"-if it can so be called-
had two dimensions. First, the pregnant language that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion" can be read as a confir-
mation and incorporation of prevailing state constitutional precepts and
practices. Such state practices included "the slender establishments" of re-
ligion in the New England states .... (and] the "establishments of relig-
iouA freedom" . . . that prevailed in Virginia and other southern and mid-
dle states. . . . Second, the embracive terms "free exercise" and
"establishment" can be read to incorporate the full range of "essential
rights and liberties" discussed in the eighteenth century.
See id. at 404-05 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). See infra notes 61-68 and ac-
companying text regarding the movement toward the "establishment of religious free-
dom" in Virginia. See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text regarding what Witte de-
scribes as the "essential rights and liberties" of religion.
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brand of separationism advocated by enlightenment thinkers and
evangelicals as the definitive mindset of the framers than to
adopt the establishmentarianism of the Puritans and civic
republicans.
B. Various Principles
Although disparate schools of thought prevailed in the late
Eighteenth Century, Witte argues that the founding generation
more or less consensually embraced a series of principles con-
cerning religious freedom that suffused and informed the Relig-
ion Clauses. According to Witte, these principles were as follows:
liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, pluralism, equal-
ity, separationism, and disestablishment of religion. These princi-
ples, which Witte describes as "the essential rights and liberties
of religion,"" characterized and animated the founding genera-
tion's thoughts about the American experiment in religious free-
dom. Moreover, argues Witte, they functioned not as formal im-
peratives, but, instead, as principles that, through relation to
each other, gave form to the Religion Clauses. 45
The first of these essential rights and liberties was liberty of
conscience, which Witte describes as the "general solvent used in
the early American experiment in religious liberty."46 The pri-
mary rationale for liberty of conscience-a rationale that, accord-
ing to Witte, even the strongest establishmentarians were willing
to concede47-was that there can be no true religious choice that
does not arise authentically from the conscience of the believer.
This idea, which has often been described as "voluntarism," per-
meated early American literature.48 In fact, it even appeared to
44. See Witte, supra note 32, at 375 (quoting EuSHA WIuJtAMs, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS: A SEASONABLE PLEA FOR THE LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, AND
THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT IN MATITRS OF RELIGION. WITHOUT ANY CONTROUL FROM
HUMAN AUTHORITY passim (1744)) (emphasis omitted).
45. See Witte, supra note 32, at 403-05.
46. See id. at 389.
47. See id. at 389 & n.86.
48. See, e.g., id at 390-91 (quoting JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIEN-
ABLE (1791), reprinted in POLITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA, 1730-1805,
1079 (1991)("Every man must give an account of himself to God and therefore every
man ought to be at liberty to serve God in that way that he can ... reconcile it to his
conscience."). As John Garvey writes with respect to voluntarism and ritual:
There is in our traditions a religious argument for religious freedom that is
peculiarly associated with ritual acts. It is, simply, that it is futile to coerce
people to perform ceremonies (prayer, worship, declarations of belief) they
don't believe in. This idea has ancient roots, but it was most fully devel-
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dominate the writings of Madison and Jefferson. 49
The remaining essential rights were, to a significant extent,
corollaries of the first. Free exercise of religion, for instance, was
cherished because it respected the right of individuals to act ac-
cording to the choices their consciences dictated. 0 Similarly, plu-
ralism, the third essential right identified by Witte, was valued in
significant part because it served the theological purpose of let-
ting God decide which religions should prosper.51 Equality, the
fourth essential right, served as a buttress to the first three, pro-
tecting people from being treated differently because of their re-
ligious choices and preventing the government from skewing the
"market" among religions or religious ideas.52
According to Witte, there was a relatively high degree of con-
sensus about the meaning of these first four "essential rights and
liberties." About the remaining two, separationism and disestab-
lishment, however, there was considerably less consensus.
Witte argues that separationism bore some instrumental rela-
tionship to the values of liberty of conscience and free exercise
of religion. That is, separationism was understood by many in
the late Eighteenth Century as a means of preventing the gov-
ernment from interfering with theological disputes within the
confines of a particular faith, or within the conscience of an in-
oped by English Protestants during the seventeenth century.... Coerced
ritual is futile because it cannot put the soul in touch with God. The indi-
vidual cannot hear God unless he has faith. And faith does not come to
people just because they go through the ritual motions. God gives it to
whom he wills. It is an idea characteristic of Protestantism that this hap-
pens in a .very individual way. The most effective medium is Scripture,
through which God may speak to the pious reader. -
See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 50 (1996) (citations omitted). Michael Mc-
Connell similarly argues that:
Religious liberty demands some degree of neutrality between religion
and unbelief. Unbelief is, after all, a system of opinions regarding the exis-
tence of God and thus regarding ultimate religious questions of life and
value. If "[t]he Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man," each person must be as free to disbelieve as
he is to believe.
McConnell, supra note 7, at 10, quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGMANST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 1 (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 64 (1947) (appendix).
49. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
50. See Witte, supra note 32, at 394.
51. See id. at 396. Some founders also advocated religious pluralism in the hope
that religions would check each others' excesses and that a plurality of religions would
ensure a division of temporal influence among them, thus preventing any single relig-
ion from dominating national politics. See id.
52. See id. at 398.
0
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dividual.53 However, not everyone understood separationism in
just this way. Although few would have objected to separating
church and state for the protection of church autonomy, some
believed strongly that such separation was also beneficial for the
polity.
54
This lack of consensus also existed with regard to disestablish-
ment. In fact, Witte writes that disestablishment was the least
consistently understood or supported principle of religious free-
dom of the founding era. As Witte notes, disestablishment was
viewed by some, such as the Puritans, as nonessential to religious
freedom.55 First, several states maintained an established religion
until well into the Nineteenth Century, as is reflected by
Madison's proposed text for the Religion Clauses, which would
have specified that there could be no national religion.5 6 Further-
more, disestablishment was understood by many others as simply
a prohibition against any attempt by the government to ordain
or to support a particular faith.57 Although these people sub-
scribed to some version of the essential rights and liberties iden-
tified by Witte-including, presumably, disestablishment at the
national level-they did not countenance the kind of strict disso-
ciation advocated vehemently by others.
53. See id. at 399-400.
54. See id. at 399-401.
55. See id. at 401. Witte notes that
[f]or some eighteenth century writers, particularly the New England Puri-
tans who defended their "slender establishments," the roll of "essential
rights and liberties [of religion]" ended [with liberty of conscience, free ex-
ercise of religion, pluralism, equality, and separationismi. For other writers,
however, the best protection of all these principles was through the explicit
disestablishment of religion.
See id.
56. See Bybee, supra note 24, at 1559.
57. See Witte, supra note 32, at 401-02. Today, most nations of the world do not
share the United States' correlation of religiots freedom with nonestablishment, and in-
ternational conventions of religious liberty do not include provisions for disestablish-
ment. See id. at 439-40. In a recent commentary on the reconstruction of civilization in
Asia, Anwar Ibrahim, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, argued that:
This reconstruction of civilization, moreover, would not be possible without
a renewal of faith in the divine. This would be Asia's singular contribution
to the world. Unlike the West since the Enlightenment, which severed itself
from the dominant world view of the Age of Faith, Asia, despite centuries
of change, still preserves its essential religious character. Faith and religious
practice are not confined to the individual; they permeate the life of the
community.
See Anwar Ibrahim, Religion and Politics, East and West, WALt. ST. J., June 6, 1996, at A14.
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On the other hand, numerous thinkers who were active in the
late Eighteenth Century did call for a fairly strict separation of
church and state, basing their advocacy on both theological and
nontheological justifications.58 With respect to nontheological
grounds for separation, for instance, Madison argued that estab-
lished religion tended to induce docility, and he provocatively
linked the spirit that had fomented the revolution to religious
dissension:
If the Church of England had been the established and general
Religion in all the Northern Colonies as it has been among us
here [in Virginia] and uninterrupted tranquility had prevailed
throughout the Continent, [i]t is clear to me that slavery and
Subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated
among us. Union of Religious Sentiments begets a surpri[s]ing
confidence and Ecclesiastical Establishments tend to great igno-
rance and Corruption[,] all of which facilitate the Execution of
mischievous Projects. 59
The multiplicity of religions also played a role in Madison's gen-
eral approach to preventing tyranny in Congress. 6° However, the-
ological grounds for strict disestablishment were also strong in
some instances, particularly in Virginia in the 1780s.
Virginia had an established Anglican Church until sometime
in the late Eighteenth Century,61 which was accompanied by per-
secution of religious dissenters. In particular, adherents of cer-
tain Baptist sects-corresponding to the evangelical school de-
scribed by Witte-were subjected to prolonged official abuse.62 In
1779, just before Thomas Jefferson was elected governor of Vir-
ginia, he proposed "A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom."
The bill reflected the enlightenment's preoccupation with reason
as the best tool for testing, religious views and rested on such ar-
58. See Witte, supra note 32, at 403.
59. 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 105 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962).
60. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 136 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961); see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 40 (1992).
61. See Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 38, 42 n.33 (1947) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting) (quoting H.J. ECKENRODE, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN
VIRGINL A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION 53, 64 (1910) (fixing the date
for Virginia's disestablishment at either 1777, when the act suspending the payment of
tithes took effect, or 1784, when Virginia defeated a proposal to revive assessments)).
62. Madison bemoaned this persecution. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11 n.9 (quoting 1
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 18, 21 (1900)). Jefferson wrote in a similar vein about
the persecution of Quakers in colonial Virginia. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA: QUERY XVII, reprinted in 1 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
LITERATURE 623-24 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 2d ed.).
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guments as the following, excerpted from the preamble of the
bill:
[T]he opinions and belief of men depend not on their own
will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their
minds ... Almighty God hath created the mind free, and mani-
fested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it al-
together insusceptible of restraint; [and] all attempts to influ-
ence it by temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness .... 63
The bill would have dislodged the Anglican faith as the estab-
lished faith in Virginia, put all religions on an equal footing in
the Commonwealth, and permanently ended the practice of as-
sessing taxpayers for the support of churches. It did not prevail,
however, until 1785.
Meanwhile, in 1784, the Virginia Assembly undertook to revive
the assessment for the support of churches, which had been sus-
pended since 1777.64 Unlike the old assessment law, the new law
would permit taxpayers to specify the faith to which their pay-
ments should be applied, although choices were limited to vari-
eties of Christianity. With Jefferson away in France, 6 Madison led
the opposition to the bill, publishing a now-famous tract entitled
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.66 In this
tract, Madison vehemently opposed the bill, not simply because
it was limited to Christian sects, but because he believed, like Jef-
ferson, that true religious experience is insusceptible to official
coercion.67 He also contended that what began as a negligible as-
sessment for the support of any Christian sect could later be ex-
panded into a substantial assessment for the support of a particu-
lar sect. For Madison, the crucial point at which to mount an
opposition to a mingling of church and state was at the first
threatened incursion, even a minor one:
[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liber-
ties.... Who does not see that the same authority which can
establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may
establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in
63. See NOONAN, supra note 34, at 103 (emphasis omitted).
64. See Eve'son, 330 U.S. at 36-37 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
65. See NOONAN, supra note 34, at 104.
66. SeeJAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST REUGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1973) [hereinafter "MADISON PAPERS"].
67. See MADISON, supra note 66, reprinted in MADISON PAPERS, supra note 66, 1.
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exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property
for the support of any one establishment, may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
6
This time, the enlightenment thinkers prevailed. The bill did not
pass, and one year later, the Assembly adopted Jefferson's Bill for
Religious Freedom.
The evidence seems fairly clear, then, that one powerful move-
ment at work in the revolutionary era, specifically the movement
responsible in Virginia for dislodging the Anglican Church and
enacting Jefferson's Bill for Religious Freedom, could be counted
on to oppose many forms of establishment. However, it is diffi-
cult to extrapolate far from this. As the language of Jefferson's
Bill for Religious Freedom and Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance demonstrates, both men couched their arguments in favor
of religious freedom in theological terms. Furthermore, both
their approaches were explicitly deistic. Similarly, Jefferson sup-
ported a variety of bills that sustained the general religious flavor
of his native commonwealth after the revolution.
69
Moreover, although it can be argued that Jefferson and
Madison couched their arguments in terms that they believed
would appeal to their audience, that kind of argument cuts both
ways. That is, there may have been other explanations for the
Virginia Assembly's decision not to revive forced tithing,70 just as
there may have been ulterior explanations for Jefferson's and
Madison's rhetoric. More importantly, however, Jefferson's and
Madison's private correspondence suggests some appreciation for
religion, if not to the extent manifested in their public utter-
ances.71 In any case, the historical record suggests that, however
68. See id. 1 3.
69. See Witte, supra note 32, at 385 (citing 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 555-
58 (Julian P. Boyd, ed. 1950)).
The law of Virginia did not live entirely by the gospel of the enlighten-
ment, however. Even Jefferson supported the revision of Virginia's post-
revolutionary laws, which included a Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Relig-
ious Worship and Sabbath Breakers; A Bill for Appointing Days of Public
Fasting and Thanksgiving; and a Bill Annulling Marriages Prohibited by the
Levitical Law, and Appointing the Mode of Solemnizing Lawful Marriage
Id.
70. See L.H. LARUE, CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW AS FIcTION: NARRATrhE IN THE RHETORIC OF
AUTHovrrY 25, 27 (1995).
71. Madison, for example, advised a young correspondent always to "keep the Min-
istry obliquely in View whatever your profession be," noting that "[t]his will lead you to
cultivate an acquainta[n]ce occasionally with the most sublime of all Sciences and will
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radically Madison, Jefferson, and similar thinkers may have
wanted to separate church and state, the new nation as a whole
did not entirely share their thinking.
The arguments and events of the founding era thus included
certain bedrock principles that any subsequent interpretation of
the Religion Clauses ought to accommodate. Principal among
these was liberty of conscience, together with liberties that were
in many respects ancillary to that liberty-free exercise, plural-
ism, and equality. Beyond that lay separation and disestablish-
ment-critical, widely held principles, but principles about which
there was little consensus, particularly at the state level. 72 As
Michael McConnell has argued:
It is sometimes forgotten that religious liberty is the central
value and animating purpose of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. The separation of church and state-a
phrase that does not appear in the First Amendment or in the
debates surrounding its adoption-is a more problematical, a
qualify you for a change of public character if you should hereafter desire it." See 1 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 96 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962) (letter of Sept. 25,
1773 to William Bradford, later Attorney General of the United States). See alSo NOONAN,
supra note 34, at 93-94. Although there may be something Machiavellian in Madison's
words, his description of the ministry as a "sublime Science" does not appear to be face-
tious. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson instructed a young man with regard to religion that:
Your reason is now mature enough to receive this object. In the first place
divest yourself of all bias in favour (sic] of novelty and singularity of opin-
ion. Indulge them in any other subject rather than that of religion. It is too
important, and the consequences of error may be too serious. On the
other hand[,] shake off all the fears and servile prejudices under which
weak minds are servilely crouched.
12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 15 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) (letter of August 10,
1787 to Peter Carr.). In this letter, Jefferson went on to advise his correspondent to let
his. investigations lead him where they may:
Do not be frightened from this enquiry by any fear of [its] consequences.
If it ends in a belief that there is no god, you will find incitements to virtue
in the comfort and pleasantness you feel in [its] exercise, and the love of
others which it will procure you. If you find reason to believe there is a
god, a consciousness that you are acting under his eye, and that he ap-
proves you, will be a vast additional incitement. If that there be a future
state, the hope of a happy existence in that increases the appetite to de-
serve it; if that Jesus was also a god, you will be comforted by a belief of his
aid and love. In fine, I repeat that you must lay aside all prejudice on both
sides, and neither believe nor reject any thing because any other person, or
description of persons have rejected or believed it. Your own reason is the
only oracle given you by heaven, and you are answerable not for the right-
ness but uprightness of the decision.
See id. at 16-17.
72. See RIcHARD B. MoRus, WITNESSES AT THE CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND
THE CONsrrrurION 109 (1985).
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more contingent, ideal than is religious liberty. The main com-
ponents of religious liberty are the autonomy of religious insti-
tutions, individual choice in matters of religion, and the free-
dom to put a chosen faith (if any) into practice. Both free
exercise and nonestablishment directly protect religious liberty:
the government may not interfere with a person's chosen relig-
ious belief and practice by prohibiting it or by exerting power
or influence in favor of any faith. The separation of church
and state is a different matter; sometimes separation enhances
religious liberty and sometimes separation diminishes it.
7 3
Consequently, the intentions originally underlying the Religion
Clauses neither required nor precluded the government from
acting in limited, general ways to accommodate or facilitate relig-
ious growth. What these intentions did demonstrate was that gov-
ernment was obligated not to use its power and prestige to influ-
ence religious development. In any case, it must be borne in
mind that, but for incorporation, the Religion Clauses would not
even apply to the states, theoretically leaving them free to adopt
an official religion. Granting the wisdom and interpretive cor-
rectness of incorporating the Establishment Clause into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question re-
mains which of the various sentiments underlying the Establish-
ment Clause, if any, ought to-or coherently can-dominate
modern doctrine. As I will discuss in the following subpart, the
founders did not cure the ambiguity of their legacy in the early
years of the republic.
73. McConnell, supra note 7, at 1. Witte similarly writes:
The vague language of the First Amendment-"Congress shall make no re-
specting an establishment"-could readily accommodate ... separationist,
equality, or noncoercion readings of "disestablishment[]" . . . [t]he best
way to assess whether a Congressional law violates this prohibition is to see
whether it compromises any one of the cardinal principles of separation-
ism, equality, and noncoercion protected by the disestablishment
guarantee.
Witte, supra note 32, at 402-03.
The principles of pluralism, equality, and separationism-separately and to-
gether-served to protect religious bodies, both from each other and from
the state. It was an open question, however, whether such principles pre-






The practices of the founding generation shortly after the rati-
fication of the Religion Clauses confirm the enduring strength of
the Puritan and civic republican models in postrevolutionary
American political culture. First, several state governments that
were not subject to the Establishment Clause, but that honored
at least a local version of the "essential rights and liberties" iden-
tified by Witte (and exercised far more power relative to the fed-
eral government than they do today), did sponsor religion dur-
ing that time, both as a whole and in particular senses.74 The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, for instance, officially spon-
sored the Congregationalist faith until 1833. 75 Similarly, the Com-
monwealth of Virginia's antipathy to the Anglican (modern-day
Episcopalian) faith resulted in a wholesale confiscation of church
lands in the late Eighteenth Century76 and prompted a prohibi-
tion against ecclesiastical corporations that continues to this day
in Virginia and West Virginia.
77
In addition, certain broad, nondenominational forms of relig-
ious sponsorship were observed at the national level in the early
years of the republic. For instance, the first Congress-the Con-
gress that generated the text of the First Amendment-installed
paid legislative chaplains. 78 That Congress also re-enacted the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which recognized "[r ] eligion, mo-
rality, and knowledge" as "necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind," and which, therefore, provided that
"schools and the means of education shall forever be en-
couraged." 79 Similarly, President Washington, acting upon con-
gressional authorization, proclaimed a day of Thanksgiving in
1789 to express gratitude to the Creator for the beneficence of
nature, and the practice has continued more or less uninter-
rupted since that time.80 In fact, these establishments were so
74. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14 n.17 (1947).
75. See generally Witte, supra note 32, at 404, 405-06. See also NOONAN, supra note 34,
at 114.
76. See Witte, supra note 32, at 385 (citing ECKENRODE, supra note 61, at 116).
77. See Witte, supra note 32, at 385 (citing Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Relig-
ious Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1499, 1529-33 (1973)).
78. See Witte, supra note 32, at 406.
79. 1 Stat. 50 (1789); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he House of Representatives took up the Northwest Ordi-
nance on the same day as Madison introduced his proposed amendments which became
the Bill of Rights").
80. See NooNAN, supra note 34, at 127-30.
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prevalent in this country that they furnish the basis for excep-
tions to the harshness of modem separationist doctrine,"t as well
as for criticisms of that doctrine.8 2
III. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
I have argued that the original intentions underlying the Relig-
ion Clauses were sufficiently ambiguous to permit a variety of in-
terpretations of the Establishment Clause, ranging from strict
separation to moderate, even-handed association. I have also ar-
gued that the practices and behavior of the founding generation
confirms that strict separation was, at most, a potential model for
the Establishment Clause. I have attributed this in part to the
fact that disestablishment was not the rule for several states and
in part to the fact that the federal government itself did not ad-
here to a model of complete separation.
One plausible inference from the existence of this ambiguity
would be that, today, lawmakers have leeway to adopt an inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause that comports with our
needs as a society. On the other hand, this original ambiguity
81. In Marsh v. Chambers, for instance, the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska
state legislature's practice of retaining a legislative chaplain, who at the time of the Su-
preme Court's decision was a Presbyterian minister receiving nearly $320 per month
from the state, and who had held the position for 18 years. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 785 (1983). Writing for the Marsh Court, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that:
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative ses-
sions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke
Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in
these circumstances, an "establishment" of religion or a step toward estab-
lishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held
among the' people of this country.... The content of the prayer is not of
concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer op-
portunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to dis-
parage any other, faith or belief.
Id. at 792. Also in this genre was Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, in which
the Supreme Court upheld New York's practice of exempting churches, along with
other charitable institutions, from property taxes, reasoning that:
The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means
co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause. To equate the two would be to deny a national heritage with roots
in the Revolution itself.
397 U.S. 664, 673 (1971).
82. Members of the Supreme Court have invoked the historical argument in criti-
cism of the harsh rule of Lemon in several cases. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
631-32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is a "longstanding American tra-
dition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally").
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would be irrelevant under some modes of constitutional interpre-
tation if it has subsequently been resolved to the satisfaction of
the polity.8 3 Alexander Bickel made such an argument about
whether the framers of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment contemplated that the Supreme Court would
eventually interpret that provision to prohibit segregation by race
in public schools.8 4 According to Bickel, the framers did not have
such an intention with regard to the "immediate effect" of the
Equal Protection Clause on "conditions then present."8 5 How-
ever, continuing his analysis, Bickel then asked whether legisla-
tors familiar with "latitudinarian" interpretation of the Constitu-
tion might have contemplated that, over time, a court would
interpret the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit segregation in
the schools.8 6 Concluding that such an outcome was not inconsis-
tent with the legislative history, Bickel argued that the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education was not a repudia-
tion of original intent.8 7 Chief Justice Warren made a similar, al-
beit less elaborate, argument in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Brown.
88
However, it probably cannot persuasively be argued that the
original "irresolution" of the Religion Clauses has been elimi-
nated to the satisfaction of the polity. Although the modem Su-
preme Court has often expressed a strict separationist view of the
83. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 44 (1991) (arguing that
Rcconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats engaged in "self-conscious acts of
(non-Article V] constitutional creation that rivaled the Founding Federalists in their
scope and depth").
84. Alexander M. Bickel, The Orignal Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L REV. 1, 63-65 (1955). The Equal Protection Clause provides that "No State shall
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85. See Bickel, supra note 84, at 58.
86. Id. at 59-64.
87. Id. at 64-65; see Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(declaring unconstitutional racial segregation in public schools). Michael McConnell
has argued that, in fact, Bickel got it wrong when he argued that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not specifically think that school segregation violated the
Equal Protection Clause. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Deci-
sions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1093 (1995) ("[lit is clear beyond peradventure that a very sub-
stantial portion of Congress, including the leading framers of the Amendment, sub-
scribed to the view that school segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment").
Because I simply use Bickel's argument as an illustration of how courts may conclusively
resolve ambiguity in the meaning of constitutional provisions, provided they accurately
capture prevailing sentiment at the time they make their decisions, it is not relevant
whether in fact Bickel's reading of history was valid.
88. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
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Establishment Clause, there are many indications that this lan-
guage has not acquired the finality of the Brown decision. Specifi-
cally, although the Supreme Court has spoken in terms of a
"wall" between church and state,89 the Supreme Court has never-
theless allowed gaps in that wall under a variety of rationales.
Prominent among these rationales are the arguments, first, that
denying public benefits to individuals or groups because of their
religious orientation would violate principles of free exercise and
equality toward religions and, second, that government should
be free to "accommodate" religious practices, particularly in
light of the Free Exercise Clause.90 Similarly, the Supreme
Court's long-standing, official rule for deciding cases under the
Establishment Clause-the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtz-
man t-although somewhat separationist in that it will not permit
accommodation, is not entirely separationist. Instead, it is an
amalgam of separationist, free exercise, and equality principles.
Consequently, the argument that the modern Supreme Court
has resolved what the founders left ambiguous is not persuasive.
In the following three subparts, I will discuss the strict separa-
tionist, accommodationist, and equal-access approaches to relig-
ious freedom.
A. Strict Separationism
The strict separationist approach to religious freedom reflects
the enlightenment and evangelical views of the postrevolutionary
era described by Witte. 92 Members of these schools advocated a
relatively discrete relationship between church and state. At least
as a rhetorical matter, the modem Supreme Court has embraced
this approach to a remarkable extent. In fact, the modem Su-
preme Court's first pronouncement on the Establishment Clause,
which appeared in the 1947 decision Everson v. Board of Education
of Ewing,93 was decidedly separationist. In that decision, Justice
Black declared on behalf of the majority that:
89. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high
and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.").
90. The "accommodationist" rationale also tends to reflect the civic-republican and
even Puritan views on the relationship between church and state identified by Witte.
91. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra note 13 for the text of the Lemon test.
92. See supra notes 35-37 and 41 and accompanying text.
93. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one relig-
ion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another....
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.94
This language was certainly a strong statement of separationism.
However, the interpretive maxim for the holding in Everson was
not the above-quoted language, but, like the Lemon test that was
to follow some twenty-four years later, an amalgam of separation-
ist, free exercise, and equality principles.
1. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing
Everson involved a New Jersey law that authorized local school
districts to enter into contracts for the transportation of children
to any school in the district, public or private, that was not oper-
ated for profit.95 The Township of Ewing enacted a resolution
pursuant to this law that authorized reimbursement for the cost
of sending children to public "and Catholic" schools. 96 Everson,
a taxpayer in the district, argued that the reimbursement vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because tax money was being
used to transport children to parochial schools.
Justice Black's response to Everson's Establishment Clause ar-
gument had two phases, a strict separationist phase and a balanc-
ing phase, the latter of which included the Supreme Court's ratio
decidendi. Justice Black began the separationist phase of his opin-
ion by describing the dangers of religious establishment, going
over, in general terms, the religious strife that had plagued Eu-
rope during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. 97 At the
culmination of this history, he declared that "[t]hese practices
94. See id. at 15-16.
95. See id. at 3.
96. See id. at 62 n.59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Although one would hope that the
school board adopted the words "and Catholic" in recognition of the fact that parents
in the district happened to send their children either to public or parochial school, the
various opinions in the case were silent on the issue. See also LARUE, supra note 70, at 28.
97. See Everson, 303 U.S. at 8-10. For an interesting literary analysis of Justice Black's
history of religious strife in Europe and the settlement of the eastern seaboard, see LA-
RUE, supra note 70, at 18-27. See also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Virginia's established church in the colonial and revolutionary era and of
some of the persecution that accompanied that establishment.
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became so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving coloni-
als into a feeling of abhorrence," at which point he cited
Madison's vexation at the imprisonment of Baptists in Virginia. 98
He then went on to quote heavily from Jefferson's Bill for Relig-
ious Freedom and Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance and to
argue that the Supreme Court could infer a nationwide senti-
ment from Virginia's experience. He concluded this discussion
by explicitly adopting the strict separationist language quoted
above as the guiding principle for interpreting the Establishment
Clause.100
If the Supreme Court had stopped its analysis at this point, the
result would probably have been clear. That is, if the Establish-
ment Clause prohibited aid to religion, the Township could not
provide free bus rides to parochial schools in which religious
doctrine was taught. However, the Supreme Court did not do
this. Instead, in something of an about-face, Justice Black noted
that the Free Exercise Clause required the State of New Jersey
not to discriminate on the basis of religion in the distribution of
a generally available public benefit.1 1 After making this observa-
tion, however, the Supreme Court faced a dilemma. If the Estab-
lishment Clause forbade aid to religion, how could people par-
ticipate on equal terms in a public program in which that
participation would indirectly aid religion? The Supreme Court
did not answer this question directly. Instead, it engaged in a sub
silentio balancing test, pursuant to which it compared the degree
to which the reimbursements promoted safety-a secular value-
and the degree to which the reimbursements promoted religion.
Concluding that the aid offered by the Township flowed to the
student and not to the school and thereby suggesting that the
causal link between the reimbursements and safety was more im-
mediate than the link between the reimbursements and religion,
the Supreme Court upheld the program.102 Although Justice
Black acknowledged that permitting the reimbursement might
have the effect of encouraging attendance at parochial schools,
he reasoned that providing bus rides-and police and fire protec-
98. See Everson, 303 U.S. at 11 & n.9.
99. See id, at 11-13.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. SeeEverson, 303 U.S. at 16-18 ("[The First] Amendment requires the state to be
a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary.").
102. See id. at 18.
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tion was commonplace 0 3 and would not contribute to the relig-
ious function of churches and church-related schools.1°4 Strictly
speaking, this could not have been true. The Township was aid-
ing religion, albeit indirectly.
Justice Jackson picked up on this. Dissenting, he claimed that
the rule announced in the first portion of the opinion-that is,
the separationist dictum about "no aid" and high walls-seemed
correct, but the decision seemed wrong. 10 5
Because the Everson Supreme Court's ratio decidendi was a bal-
ancing of separationist against "equal access" and free exercise
principles, Justice Black's "no aid" declaration was technically
dictum. Nevertheless, it was strongly worded. In fact, his adop-
tion of strict separationist rhetoric purported to resolve the ambi-
guity left by the founders. That is, by equating Virginia's ap-
proach to religious freedom with that of the colonies as a whole
and by ignoring the divergent schools of thought in the colonies
at the time, particularly in New England, the Everson Court
seemed to elevate evangelical and enlightenment views to a level
of dominance that could only by supported by revisionist
history.1°6
In fact, even the balancing test upon which the Everson Court
rested its decision was more separationist than the founders' leg-
acy because that test indicated that the Supreme Court would
not permit official acts that happened to aid religion, except
when such aid was "incidental" to the pursuit of a secular goal.
This approach would prohibit government actions intended to aid
religion, a category of actions that would have been integral to a
Puritan or civic-republican approach to religious freedom. This
103. See id. at 17-18.
104. See id. at 18.
105. See id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[T]he undertones of the [Court's] opin-
ion, advocating complete and uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem
utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educa-
tional matters"). Justice Rutledge made an argument similar to Justice Jackson's but
stated his views much more emphatically:
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official establish-
ment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation
such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily it
was to uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than sepa-
rating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete
and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil au-
thority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support
for religion.
Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., .dissenting).
106. See generally LARuE, supra note 70, at 24-27.
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category of actions would also seem to cohere with the free-
exercise principle identified by Witte, as well as with the words of
the Free Exercise Clause. Before long, however, the impact of
Everson's dictum and rationale were limited by the emergence of
the accommodationist principle10 7 and by the expansion of the
equal-access principle. 10 8
This is not to suggest, however, that Everson's dictum never
bore fruit. On the contrary, the Supreme Court went on to cut a
fairly clear "no aid" path in a long line of cases with only one
exception °9 that involved religion and the public schools. In fact,
in the first case involving the Establishment Clause after Everson,
McCollum v. Board of Education,110 the Supreme Court adhered to
a strict separationist position in invalidating a "release time" pro-
gram for religious instruction in a public school system.
2. McCollum v. Board of Education
McCollum involved a program in the public schools in Cham-
paign, Illinois. Under this program, time was set aside during the
school day for religious instructors to enter the schools and to
instruct, in religious matters,"' those students whose parents had
signed authorization cards. 112 The school enforced attendance
through its ordinary rules against truancy. Students whose par-
ents did not authorize release time were required to "leave their
classrooms" and go elsewhere in the building-presumably study
hall-to pursue secular studies during the release time period."3
With only one dissent, the Supreme Court struck down the
practice. Justice Black, the author of Everson, began his opinion
for the McCollum Court by describing the case as one about "the
power of a state to utilize its tax-supported public school system
in aid of religious instruction."" 4 By framing the issue in this
manner, Black suggested that Champaign's schools were seeking
to exact for religious instruction the same "threepence" that had
107. See infra notes 123-56 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 157-227 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text regarding the one "accommoda-
tionist" decision in the context of religion and the public schools, Zorach v. Clausen,
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
110. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
111. See id. at 205.
112. See id. at 207-08 & n.2.
113. Id. at 209.
114. Id. at 204-05.
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exercised Madison in 1784.115 What bothered Black was that
school facilities, physical resources paid for by taxpayers, to-
gether with the compulsory education laws, were being used to
facilitate religious instruction.116 Moreover, unlike the program at
issue in Everson, in which the Township had indirectly promoted
religious education while pursuing the secular goal of ensuring
the safety of schoolchildren, the Champaign program did not ap-
pear to serve any secular purpose. The school board made no ar-
gument, for instance, that keeping the students on school prop-
erty during religious instruction ensured their safety. The
program, in short, was a pure accommodation of religion that
was designed to make religious instruction easier.
Aside from elevating Everson's strict separationist dictum to the
level of black-letter law, however, McCollum did little to resolve
the ambiguity created by the Everson decision. The holding in Ev-
erson had turned on a comparison of the causal links between
free bus rides, safety, and religious instruction, but had offered
little guidance about how these links were to be compared. The
McCollum case did little to rectify this situation because the free
facilities (classrooms) and services (enforcement of the anti-
truancy laws) provided in McCollum were incidental to nothing,
and no balancing was required. Thus, McCollum was an easy case
for a Court convinced of the wisdom of Everson. Nevertheless,
McCollum was a clear instance of separationism, however sporadi-
cally the Supreme Court has adhered to that doctrine in other
cases involving the Religion Clauses.
3. Separationism since McCollum
McCollum was only the first of many decisions in which the Su-
preme Court adopted a strict separationist approach to religion
and the public schools. Over the years, in fact, the Supreme
Court has often interpreted the Establishment Clause to prohibit
religious texts and iconography from the public schools, striking
down such diverse practices as the reading of a uniform nonde-
nominational prayer daily in the classroom to invoke God's bless-
ings,117 the daily reading of verses from the Bible," 8 the place-
115. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
116. See McCollur, 333 U.S. at 209-10.
117. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The prayer was as follows: "Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us,
our parents, our teachers, and our Country." See id. at 422.
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ment of the Ten Commandments on the wall of classrooms
(except as a subject of comparative study), 9 the official authori-
zation of a moment of silence for the purpose of facilitating pri-
vate prayer, 120 a requirement that Darwin's theory of natural se-
lection always be taught in conjunction with Creationist
explanations of the origin of species, 121 and a nonsectarian
prayer at a high school graduation ceremony.122 However, the
balance of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine
has been decidedly less separationist. I will now discuss the ac-
commodationist and equal-access approaches to religious free-
dom, neither of which may be reconciled neatly with strict
separationism.
B. Accommodationism
Official "accommodation" of religious practices is a lesser in-
cluded component of a civic-republican or Puritan approach to
the relationship between church and state. That is, without nec-
essarily agreeing that religion is intrinsically good for people or
for the state, the accommodationist would at least allow the gov-
ernment to facilitate religious practices in order to preserve tran-
quility. Moreover, accommodationism is a cognate of the free-
exercise principle described by Witte and articulated by the Free
Exercise Clause because it recognizes an affirmative power in
government to act to facilitate free exercise. However, as Michael
McConnell has argued, it is difficult to fix its constitutional
pedigree:
Despite its prominence in recent Terms, the concept of ac-
commodation has not been precisely defined or located within
First Amendment doctrine. Is it an exception to the Establish-
ment Clause, an adjunct to the Free Exercise Clause, or simply
the result of "play in the joints" between the two Clauses?
123
118. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 224-25
(1963).
119. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
120. See generally Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
121. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The Supreme Court has also
struck down a state law forbidding the teaching of Darwin's theory in the schools, rea-
soning that the motivation behind the exclusion was to protect religious ideas. See Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
122. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The Supreme Court's solicitude to
the potential for establishment in the public schools has generally been attributed to
the impressionability of children. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60 n.51.
123. McConnell, supra note 7, at 4.
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Nevertheless, accommodation, a category of actions logically ex-
cluded by strict separationism, has long served as a rationale for
decisions interpreting the Establishment Clause. In fact, only
four years after the Supreme Court staked out a clear separation-
ist position in McCollum, the Supreme Court issued an accom-
modationist opinion in Zorach v. Clausen, 24 another case involv-
ing a release time program. This time, however, the Supreme
Court sustained the program, notwithstanding the fact that it
served no articulated secular purpose.
1. Zorach v. Clausen
The program at issue in Zorach, which had been adopted by
the City of New York, was slightly different than the Champaign
program, but not in a sense that should have mattered under a
straightforward application of McCollum. Under the New York
program, students were released during the school day on the
condition that they attend classes for religious instruction or de-
votional exercises at a location off school grounds.125 Thus, the
New York program differed from the Champaign program in two
respects. First, clergy and other religious instructors did not
enter the schoolhouse for purposes of instruction, and second,
school facilities were not used for that purpose. However, the
New York program and the Champaign program shared the
characteristic of using the compulsory attendance laws, together
with parental authorization, to enforce attendance at classes in
religious instruction. 26 They also shared, presumably, the charac-
teristic of subjecting nonparticipating students to what might be
considered dead time in study hall.
Inexplicably, given McCollum, the Zorach Court upheld the New
York program 27 even though the New York program aided relig-
ion in general and served no articulated secular purpose. In-
stead, the Supreme Court identified a value in the official ac-
commodation of religious practices. As Justice Douglas, writing
for the Supreme Court, reasoned:
124. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
125. See id. at 308.
126. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas indicated in a footnote, how-
ever, that the school system did not ultimately punish any students for failure to attend
religious education classes. See id. at 311 n.6.
127. See id. at 315.
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When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and ac-
commodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a require-
ment that the government show a callous indifference to relig-
ious groups.128
With this declaration, Justice Douglas appeared to constitutional-
ize a civic-republican or Puritan approach to religious freedom.
129
He also announced a rule that comported far more easily with
the free-exercise and equality principles than did Everson's strict
separationist dictum or the rule of McCollum. However, he cer-
tainly did not reiterate the strict separationism of Everson's dic-
tum or McCollum.
Justice Douglas did not acknowledge any discrepancy between
the earlier decisions, which he had joined, and Zorach. The dis-
crepancy did not escape the notice of Justice Black, however,
who argued in dissent that any use of the state's coercive power
to aid or to inhibit religion "or to prefer all religious sects over
nonbelievers or vice versa" violated the Establishment Clause.
130
Although Justice Black's resolution of Everson had not cohered
with his "no aid" dictum, his belief in the possibility of strict sep-
aration was consistent.
2. Accommodationism Since Zorach
In the years since Zorach, the Supreme Court has embraced an
accommodationist rationale on a number of occasions, although
rarely in the unadulterated sense of Zorach. In Walz v. Tax Com-
mission of New York, for example, the Supreme Court upheld New
York's practice of exempting church real estate-along with the
real estate of several other categories of nonprofit groups-from
property taxes.1 31 The exemption had the effect of accommodat-
ing church ownership of property and, therefore, aiding religion
by exempting churches from an otherwise generally applicable
burden. Moreover, although it may be argued that the exemp-
tion did not aid religion per se because it applied to certain
128. Id. at 313-14.
129. See supra notes 33-34 and 38-40 and accompanying text.
130. 343 U.S. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting).
131. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1971).
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nonreligious entities as well, this argument ultimately falters be-
cause churches were still included within the category of favored
entities.132 In other words, religion was preferred to some extent.
3. Accommodationism via Interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause
Notwithstanding such relatively straightforward accommoda-
tionist decisions as Zorach and Walz, however, perhaps the most
telling example of "accommodationism" has come with expan-
sive interpretation of what the Free Exercise Clause requires of
lawmakers. To the extent that the courts subject actions that re-
strict free exercise to critical review, the duty of legislators to
avoid such restrictions in order to preempt lawsuits expands. A
discussion of the development of free-exercise doctrine will illus-
trate the pressure to "accommodate" religion that arises as a
consequence of judicial enforcement of that Clause, although re-
cent changes in free-exercise doctrine may limit the impact of
this phenomenon. 3
3
a. Early Free-Exercise Doctrine and Sherbert v. Verner
Many of the Supreme Court's early decisions interpreting the
Free Exercise Clause involved claims by adherents of minority re-
ligions that states were infringing on their rights of free exer-
cise. 13 This line of cases probably reached its zenith in the 1963
decision Sherbert v. Verner.135 In this case, a Seventh-Day Adventist
lost her job because she refused to work on Saturday, her chosen
Sabbath. After she failed to find another employer who could ac-
commodate the demands of her religion, Sherbert sought bene-
132. Cf Schwarz, supra note 7, at 695 (arguing that a "no religious classification"
test would not permit singling out churches, along with other entities, as the benefi-
ciaries of a ordinance prohibiting raucous noise near activities requiring tranquil sur-
roundings, because, although the church would be protected along with other entities,
it would still be favored over entities that are excluded from the ordinance).
133. See infra notes 142-55 for a discussion of recent limitations on the impact of
the Free Exercise Clause.
134. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (striking down a state
statute that prevented a Jehovah's Witness from attempting to sell religious tracts door-
to-door without a certificate issued by a local official); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 117 (1943)(striking down a local ordinance that imposed a tax upon persons who
attempted to distribute and sell religious literature in a residential area without a
license).
135. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
1997] 1123
1124 UNIVERS1TY OF CJNCANNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
fits from the state's fund for the unemployed. The agency that
administered the fund denied her claim, invoking a portion of
the law governing the fund that denied benefits to persons who
lacked "good cause" for refusing "suitable work when offered." 136
In response, Sherbert argued that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quired the state to grant an exemption from the law to persons
whose refusal to take employment arose from religious scruples.
Agreeing, the Supreme Court ordered the state to carve out an
exception for people in Sherbert's position.1 37 In reaching its de-
cision, the Supreme Court engaged in two stages of analysis.
First, it asked whether the state's rule, as applied to Sherbert, im-
posed a substantial burden on her exercise of religion. The Su-
preme Court concluded that it did.138 The Supreme Court then
asked whether the state had a compelling reason to deny an ex-
emption to Sherbert and concluded that it did not.139
The Sherbert decision aligned the doctrine of the Free Exercise
Clause with the doctrine of numerous other provisions of the
Constitution designed to protect individual liberties. By ruling
that lawmakers needed a compelling reason to impair substan-
tially the free exercise of religion, the Sherbert Court required
roughly the same degree of scrutiny for claims under the Free
Exercise Clause as for claims under the Free Speech' 40 or Equal
Protection Clauses.14' However, for purposes of this Article, the
important thing Sherbert did was to encourage legislators seeking
to avoid litigation to anticipate instances in which generally ap-
plicable laws would unnecessarily impose a substantial burden on
free exercise. Consequently, and ironically, the Sherbert Court en-
couraged lawmakers to accommodate religion.
136. See id. at 401.
137. See id. at 410.
138. See id. at 403-04.
139. See id. at 407-09.
140. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83, 395 (1992). The Free
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment provide that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
141. Cf Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Classifications based solely on
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions
and hence constitutionally suspect."). Bolling, an action against an officer of the United
States, actually involved the equal protection "component" of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause, which applies to the federal government. See id. at 500. That Clause
provides that "No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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b. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith
The Supreme Court seemed to limit Sherbert to its facts, how-
ever, in the 1990 decision Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith.142 In Smith, the Supreme Court decided
that, for the most part, facially neutral laws of general applicabil-
ity that incidentally impose a burden on religion are subject to,
at most, a form of intermediate scrutiny.1 43 Respondents, who
counseled others regarding the abuse of drugs and alcohol, in-
gested sacramental peyote in the course of practicing their relig-
ion.1" They were fired when their employer, a drug rehabilita-
tion program, learned of their act.1 45 Respondents then sought
compensation from the state's fund for the unemployed, but pe-
titioner, the agency of the state charged with administering the
fund, denied their application on the grounds that they had lost
their jobs for committing a crime./46 In an action for legal and
equitable relief, respondents argued that Oregon's law prohibit-
ing the ingestion of peyote violated the Constitution insofar as it
prohibited their free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that the law did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause as long as its impact upon religious practice, as opposed
to religious belief, was incidental to the enforcement of a facially
neutral, generally applicable law.147 Because the law applied uni-
formly to all ingestion of peyote, the Supreme Court concluded
that it met the requirements of the Free Exercise Clause.148
As a result of the Smith decision, it appears that, with some ex-
ceptions to be discussed presently, courts will subject claimed vio-
lations of free exercise to, at most, a heightened form of mini-
mum rationality review. Consequently, under Smith, legislators
arguably may ignore religious practices in enacting generally ap-
plicable laws, and at least some of the incongruity between
nonestablishment and free-exercise doctrine has been
eliminated.
On the other hand, at least part of the Supreme Court has
142. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
143. See id. at 881-82.
144. See id. at 872.
145. See id.
146. See id
147. See id. at 878-79.
148. See id. at 882.
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criticized Smith. 49 More importantly, the opinion itself contains
several exceptions to its otherwise broad rule. These include an
exception for Sherbert itself (or, more accurately, for cases involv-
ing unemployment benefits),150 a possible exception for situa-
tions in which "individualized government assessment" of a par-
ticular claim for relief is feasible,151 an exception when the
government attempts to regulate pure belief,52 and an exception
when so-called "hybrid rights"-such as a combination of free
speech and free exercise-are at stake.153 In light of these many
exceptions, it arguably is not advisable, even under Smith, for
public officials to assume in all instances that laws of general ap-
plicability are insulated from effective challenge notwithstanding
their incidental impact on religious practices. Finally, Smith does
not apply when the government singles out a religious practice
for negative treatment. 5 4 And, to the extent officials take free-




The upshot of an expansive interpretation of the free-exercise
principle, to the extent it survives Smith, is that lawmakers must
149. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. CL 2157, 2176 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("I remain of the view that Smith was wrongly decided, and I would use this
case to reexamine the Court's holding there."); id at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I
have serious doubts about the precedential value of the Smith rule and its entitlement to
adherence."); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice O'Connor that the Su-
preme Court should have directed the parties in Boerne to brief the question whether
Smith was correctly decided).
150. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
151. See id. at 884.
152. See id. at 877.
153. See id. at 881-82.
154. See id. at 877-78.
155. In 1993, Congress attempted to intervene in the controversy created by Smith
by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1448 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)). In the most important provision of RFRA, Congress provided
that neither the federal government nor the states could impose a substantial burden
on free exercise unless the burden promoted a compelling public interest and was the
least restrictive means of doing so. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b); 2000bb-2(1). More-
over, this rule applied even to laws of general applicability. See id. § 2000bb-1 (a). By en-
acting RFRA, Congress purported to reinstate the rule of Sherbert and to "overrule"
Smith. The RFRA's stated purpose was to do so. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b)(1). In 1997,
however, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as a violation of separation of powers.
See Boerne, 117 S. CL at 2172. Congress's power to limit the impact of federal law on re-
ligious practice, however, may survive Boerne.
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try to alleviate the effect of secular policies upon religious prac-
tices when the burden on religion is substantial, but the cost of
accommodation would be slight. Although such an approach is
fully consistent with an accommodationist view of nonestablish-
ment, it is not consistent with strict separation. In fact, writing in
the period between Sherbert and Smith, Michael McConnell identi-
fied as an anomaly of the Religion Clauses that an accommoda-
tion of religious practice by government was more likely to come
about because of a lawsuit under the Free Exercise Clause than
because of a voluntary accommodation by government, which is
subject to the more exacting scrutiny of the Lemon test (or an in-
terpretive equivalent).156 In any case, the very existence of the ac-
commodationist principle, whether predicated on free-exercise
or on civic-republican approaches to church-state relations, ex-
hibits the failure of strict separationism to capture the debate. In
the next subpart, I will discuss how the growing vitality of the
equal-access principle in interpretation of the Religion Clauses
further demonstrates this failure.
C. Equal Access
Like strict separationism, the "equal access" principle is a for-
mal interpretive maxim for the Religion Clauses. This maxim is
predicated upon the equality principle identified by Witte. In ad-
dition, like accommodationism, the equal-access principle cannot
be reconciled with strict separation. With the possible exception
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rosenberger v. Rector
and Visitors of the University of Virginia,157 however, the Supreme
Court has never adopted a strict equal-access approach to the
Religion Clauses. In other words, it has never held that relig-
iously oriented entities may always participate in a public pro-
gram on an equal footing with nonreligiously oriented entities,
regardless of how much such participation in fact redounds to
the benefit of religion.15 8 Instead, the Supreme Court has always
156. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 6 ("Indeed, the Court's analysis [of cases impli-
cating the Religion Clauses] creates the impression that an accommodation ... is more
likely to be required than permitted."). See also Schwarz, supra note 7, at 692 ("[I]t is ar-
guable that the establishment clause invalidates military service exemptions granted con-
scientious objectors, while the free exercise clause compels them.").
157. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). See infra notes 189-226 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of this case.
158. Justice Scalia seemed to make the contrary claim in his plurality opinion in
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 764 (1995)("[W]e have
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tempered the equal-access rationale with considerations of the
extent to which the official action at issue promotes religion.
The first instance in which this occurred was Everson itself. In
that case, the Supreme Court upheld the reimbursement of par-
ents for the cost of sending their children to Catholic school by
bus on the grounds that, generally speaking, people ought to de-
rive equal benefits from public programs without regard to relig-
ion and, specifically, that the reimbursements promoted the sec-
ular goal of safety more directly than they promoted religious
education.
The Supreme Court's equal-access decisions since Everson have
generally borne the imprint of that case, even after the three-
part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman s9 superseded the unarticulated
balancing test of Everson. Moreover, as in Everson, the Supreme
Court's equal-access decisions have typically rested upon constitu-
tional provisions other than the Establishment Clause. These pro-
visions have included the Free Exercise Clause, as was the case in
Everson, or, more recently, the Free Speech and Press Clauses of
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Most importantly, however, as was the
case with Everson, none of these decisions has been reconcilable
with strict separationism. In fact, in two recent cases prominently
featuring free speech claims, as opposed to free exercise claims,
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette'6 and Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,161 the Supreme
Court has come close to, if not succeeded in, repudiating central
values of strict separationism in its pursuit of the equal-access
principle. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss some of the
consistently held that it is no violation for government to enact neutral policies that
happen to benefit religion."). See also infra note 185 and accompanying text.
159. In Lemon, the issue for the Supreme Court's attention was whether two state
programs for aid to private schools, including religious schools, violated the Establish-
ment Clause. One, administered by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, provided for
reimbursements to schools for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional
materials in certain secular subjects. 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971). The second, adminis-
tered by the State of Rhode Island, involved a supplement paid by the State to teachers
in non-public elementary schools of 15% of their salary. See id. at 607. After weaving the
rules of earlier cases together to form the now-famous test, see id. at 611-13 (citing Board
of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1971)), the Supreme Court concluded that both programs violated the Constitution be-
cause their enforcement would entail excessive entanglements between church and
state. See id. at 613-14.
160. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
161. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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early equal access cases, after which I will discuss Pinette and
Rosenberger.
1. Widmar v. Vincent
One of the Supreme Court's first equal access decisions not
predicated solely upon the Free Exercise Clause was Widmar v.
Vincent,162 which the Court handed down in 1981. In Widmar, the
Supreme Court reviewed a policy at the University of Missouri at
Kansas City (UMKC) under which registered student groups
were prohibited from using university buildings and grounds for
"religious worship or religious teaching," but were otherwise gen-
erally permitted to use such facilities. A student group seeking to
use university facilities for "nondevotional" religious purposes ar-
gued that this policy violated the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses of the First Amendment. In response, the University ar-
gued that allowing such activities in a public space would violate
the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court invalidated the
exclusion. 63 Applying the Lemon test, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that permitting student groups to use the facilities on a
content-neutral basis would promote free discussion, a secular
goal. 64 Moreover, the Supreme Court reasoned, enforcing a re-
ligious exclusion would require the monitoring of student meet-
ings, thereby risking excessive entanglements. 165 Finally, the Su-
preme Court concluded that allowing religious groups to use the
facilities would only incidentally help religion. 166 Prominent in
the Supreme Court's analysis was the observation that the use of
the facilities for nondevotional exercises would not give rise to
an impression that UMKC was sponsoring religion. 67 However, it
was not dispositive to the Supreme Court's analysis that such use
of the facilities might happen to help religion.
2. Between Widmar and Pinette
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens168 and
162. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
163. See id. at 277.
164. See id. at 271-72 & n.10.
165. See id. at 271-72 & n.11.
166. See id. at 274, 275.
167. See id. at 273-74.
168. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District'69 followed
conceptually on the heels of Widmar, although Mergens did not
feature a majority analysis of the Establishment Clause issue. In
Mergens, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal Equal Access
Act' 170 to require a local school district to permit a student
"Christian Club" to meet on school premises to "read, discuss
the Bible, have fellowship, and pray together."17' That Act pro-
hibited public secondary schools that receive federal financial as-
sistance and that maintain a "limited open forum" from denying
equal access to students who wish to meet in the forum on the
basis of the content of the speech at the proposed meeting.
72
Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, concluded that
permitting the club to meet at the school would not violate the
Establishment Clause because school authorities would not lead
or direct the meetings and because no message of official ap-
proval or endorsement for Christianity would be conveyed by the
use of the meeting space. 173 Similarly, in Lamb's Chapel, the Su-
preme Court required a school district to permit a group with a
religious theme to use a generally available school facility during
off-hours even though the facility was not a public forum.
74
Although Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel were based on ra-
tionales that cannot be squared with strict separationism, these
cases did manage to straddle separationism and equal access like
Everson and Lemon. Such straddling occurred again in the recent
decision Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 75 al-
though the straddle in Pinette, like the straddle in Mergens, can
only be inferred from what the various opinions in the case had
in common. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia176 either
169. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
170. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994).
171. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 232-33.
172. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1994).
173. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-52 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Scalia, reasoned that allowing the students to use the space would not violate the
Establishment Clause because the school would not be conferring enough of a benefit
upon religion to constitute an establishment, nor would it be coercing students into
participating in religion. See id. at 260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
concurring in part). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the judg-
ment. See id. at 262-70.
174. See 508 U.S. at 391-97.
175. 515 U;S. 753 (1995).
176. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
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explicitly elevated equal-access over separationist principles or
was an instance' of contextual decision-making.
3. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette
In Pinette, the Ohio Ku Klux Klan (the Klan) wanted to erect a
cross on Capitol Square, a small park surrounding the Ohio
State Capitol Building in Columbus, Ohio. Petitioner, the Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board, was responsible for issuing
permits for use of the park. When the Klan applied for a permit,
the Board had already allowed at least one private party to place
an "unattended display" in the park.7 7 The Board denied the
Klan's application, however, on the grounds that permitting a
cross to be erected directly in front of the State Capitol would
have given at least some people the impression that the state was
sponsoring Christianity.178 The Klan, through its leader, Pinette,
obtained an order in the United States District. Court for the
Southern District of Ohio requiring the Board to issue the per-
mit,179 and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.180 The Supreme Court also
affirmed.18'
In the parts of his opinion that constituted the opinion of the
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia pointed out in fairly short order
that on at least two previous occasions-in Widmar and Lamb's
Chapel-the Court had required instrumentalities of state govern-
ments to make generally available public facilities available to re-
ligious groups as well. Justice Scalia failed to mention in his dis-
cussion of these cases, however, that the Supreme Court had
concluded in both instances that granting access to the religious
group in question was not likely to be interpreted as a govern-
mental endorsement of religion.18 2 Nor, however, did he make
177. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 758. On the day the Klan
filed its application, the Board granted permission to a rabbi to erect a menorah on the
park. See id.
178. See id. at 761.
179. See Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.
Ohio 1993).
180. See Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 30 F.3d 675 (6th Cir.
1995).
181. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770.
182. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395
(1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981). In Lamb's Chape4 the Supreme
Court concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have
been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing
religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion' or to the Church would
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the contrary assertion that a perception of official endorsement
of religion would have been irrelevant to the Courts that decided
Widmar and Lamb's ChapeL Meanwhile, Justices O'Connor, Souter,
and Breyer, who joined this portion of his opinion, adhered to
the familiar rule that the mere appearance of religious favoritism
by government officials can, in some instances, constitute a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause, even if the officials' only af-
firmative acts are to extend a generally available benefit to a
group with a religious message.18 3
The opaque position staked out by the plurality and joined by
the concurring justices preserved the balance between strict
separationism and equal access that the Supreme Court had
achieved in such varied decisions as Everson and Widmar. How-
ever, although the rationale of Pinette followed the inchoate bal-
ancing of earlier decisions, the separate opinions in the case il-
lustrated the divergence of views on the Supreme Court and the
potential for a radical equal-access principle.
Perhaps most striking was the balance of Justice Scalia's opin-
ion, which was joined by' only three other justices.1 8 In this part
of his opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the test for violation of
the Establishment Clause, at least with respect to public forums,
is not whether there has been an appearance of government en-
dorsement of religion, but whether there has actually been such
endorsement.185 He, thus, demonstrated a willingness to uphold
a neutrally applied law against all Establishment Clause chal-
lenge, even if the effect of the law would be to promote religion
substantially. Meanwhile, both the concurring and dissenting Jus-
tices adhered to the familiar practice of balancing.1 86
have been no more than incidental." Lamb's Chape, 508 U.S. at 395.
183. See infra note 186 for a discussion of Justice O'Connor's and Justice Souter's
opinions in Pinett Justice Breyer joined in these opinions.
184. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined this portion
of Justice Scalia's opinion. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 763.
185. Justice Scalia stated that:
We find it peculiar to say that government "promotes" or "favors" a relig-
ious display by giving it the same access to a public forum that all other dis-
plays enjoy. And as a matter of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we
have consistently held that it is no violation for government to enact neu-
tral policies that happen to benefit religion.
Id. at 763-64.
186. Justice O'Connor advocated a test based on the tort law concept of a "reasona-
bly prudent person." Under her approach, a court adjudicating a claim like Pinette's
would focus on the perceptions of a person reasonably aware of who owned Capitol
Square, the uses to which the park had been put, the significance of a cross, and similar
facts. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 778-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter espoused a
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The Pinette Court thus came within one vote of embracing, at
least in one context, a radical approach to equal access that
would have cut that principle from any connection to strict
separationism18 7 In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia,188 by contrast, the Supreme Court either found a fifth
vote for the elevation of equal access over strict separationism or
engaged in a context-based analysis.
4. Rosenberger
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia, an instrumentality of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, refused to release money from a
student activities fund for the printing of a student newspaper,
Wide Awake, because of the newspaper's religious message, al-
though the University generally released money from the fund
for the expenses of student papers.18 9 By a five-four majority, the
Supreme Court held that the University could not deny funding
to the students without running afoul of the Free Speech and
Press Clauses of the First Amendment. 190
a. Facts
In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia recognized certain stu-
dent groups as "contracted independent organizations," or
similar position. See id. at 785-92 (Souter, J., concurring). Dissenting Justice Stevens was
not willing to attribute as much background knowledge to this theoretical passerby as
the concurring justices. See id. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Uustice O'Connor's]
'reasonable person' comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law
model.").
The dissenting justices, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, agreed that the appearance
of endorsement alone could suffice to state a violation of the Establishment Clause, but,
unlike Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, maintained that sufficiently apparent en-
dorsement was present in this case. See id. at 806-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that "the Constitution generally forbids the placement of a symbol of a religious charac-
ter in, on, or before a seat of government"), 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("If the aim
of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to uncouple government from church, a State
may not permit, and a court may not order, a display of this character [citation omit-
ted]."). In fact, their essentially prophylactic argument approached strict separationism.
187. In this regard, the Supreme Court came close to embracing the principle of
"no religious classification" advocated by Philip Kurland, pursuant to which the two Re-
ligion Clauses would be unified to prohibit any official classification based upon relig-
ion, whether by way of inclusion or exclusion. PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw
18 (1962).
188. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
189. See id. at 823-27.
190. See id. at 845-46.
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"CIO's." This designation entitled the group to use certain facili-
ties belonging to the University, such as meeting rooms and
computer terminals. 191 Wide Awake Productions (WAP), the or-
ganization that published Wide Awake, was a CIO, although it
would have been ineligible for that status had it been a "relig-
ious organization," defined by University Guidelines as "an or-
ganization whose purpose is to practice a devotion to an ac-
knowledged ultimate reality or deity. ' 192 In addition, the
University maintained a "Student Activities Fund," or "SAF," for
which it collected fourteen dollars per semester from each full-
time student. Under guidelines promulgated by the University,
CIO's could request an SAF disbursement for "appropriate"
third-party expenses, subject to certain exceptions.1 93 One such
exception was that the University would not release SAF funds to
pay for the costs of printing any paper that "primarily promotes
or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ulti-
mate reality."19
Pursuant to this guideline, the Appropriations Committee of
the Student Council denied WAP's application for SAF funding
of their newspaper, Wide Awake: a Christian Perspective at the Uni-
versity of Virginia.195 WAP could not realistically deny that this ex-
ception applied to its activities. In fact, as Justice Souter pointed
out in his dissent, the editors and contributors to the journal
adopted an explicitly evangelical Christian approach to journal-
ism. 196 After the full Student Council and the Student Activities
Committee sustained the Appropriations Committee's decision,
197
WAP filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, arguing that the University had violated its
rights to freedom of speech and press, to free exercise of relig-
ion, and to equal protection of the laws. 198 The district court
ruled in favor of the University, 199 and the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed.200 In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined
191. See id. at 823.
192. Id. at 826.
193. Id. at 824-25.
194. Id. at 825.
195. Id. at 827.
196. See id at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying note 217 for
an excerpt of Justice Souter's argument about the newspaper's evangelism.
197. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827.
198. See id. at 827.
199. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 183-
84 (W.D.Va. 1992).
200. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 288 (4th
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by four other Justices, the Supreme Court reversed, 201 adhering
to an apparently equal-access rationale. Justice Souter, joined by
three other justices, dissented on separationist grounds.2
b. The Opinion of the Supreme Court
As in Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb's Chapel, the Establishment
Clause played a defensive role in the litigation in Rosenberger. In
other words, the University was trying to use the Clause as a
shield to WAP's action under other provisions of the Constitu-
tion. Consequently, the Supreme Court first had to decide
whether WAP had a persuasive complaint under those provisions.
After deciding that it did,203 the Supreme Court turned to the
University's defense.
The SAF, Justice Kennedy noted, was generally available for
the support of, among other things, the student press at the Uni-
versity.2 Because it could be administered without regard to the
religious or nonreligious viewpoint of recipients, Justice Kennedy
concluded that using the SAF to pay for the printing of Wide
Awake would not violate the Establishment Clause. Invoking the
equality principle, he argued that such use would satisfy the re-
quirement of "neutrality towards religion," which he described as
a "significant factor" in upholding official practices against chal-
lenge under the Establishment Clause.205
Had Justice Kennedy stopped here, his opinion for the Su-
preme Court substantially would have subordinated separationist
to equal-access principles. That is, the Supreme Court would
have held that an instrumentality of a state government could
pay for the printing of an explicitly religious newspaper if the
benefit conferred was generally available to nonreligious newspa-
pers. However, Justice Kennedy mitigated the impact of his rea-
soning by going on to identify certain technical distinctions that,
he argued, justified the Supreme Court's decision. For instance,
Cir. 1994).
201. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 846 (1995).
202. See id. at 863 (dissenting opinion).
203. See id. at 837. Justice Kennedy argued that Wue Awakes approach to issues of
student interest was more a point of view than a distinct subject matter. Consequently,
he reasoned, the University could not exclude it without discriminating on the basis of
viewpoint, an act that would presumptively violate the Free Speech and Press Clauses of
the First Amendment. See u at 830-31, 835-37.
204. See id. at 840.
205. Id. at 839.
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he noted that the money at issue came from a student fund and
not a general tax, such as the tax that Virginia would have im-
posed had Madison not prevailed in the 1780s.206 Moreover, Jus-
tice Kennedy observed that WAP would never receive SAF money
directly.2 7 Finally, he argued that there was little chance that SAF
funding for WAP would be perceived as. governmental support
for religion due to the "pains" taken by the University to dissoci-
ate itself from WAP.208 In light of these caveats, the Rosenberger
Court arguably did not elevate equal-access principles over sepa-
rationist principles, particularly in light of Pinette, decided the
same term, and in light of Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Ro-
senberger itself.
c. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Although Justice O'Connor joined the opinion of the Supreme
Court, she wrote separately to stress her belief that the holding
in Rosenberger was predicated on certain circumstances present in
that case and not necessarily likely to recur often.2°9 Her opinion
gave a temporary flavor to the assertions of the majority. The fac-
tors that led her to perceive Rosenberger as something of an ad hoc
decision were as follows: (1) the newspaper explicitly disclaimed
any association with the University;210 (2) the University would
pay Wide Awake's vendors directly; therefore, at no point would
the students' money fall into the hands of WAP;211 (3) the press
at the University comprised numerous alternative points of view,
reducing the possibility that Wide Awake would dominate dis-
course or that people could reasonably perceive official endorse-
ment of religion;212 and (4) Justice O'Connor noted that students
206. See id. at 840-41.
207. See id. at 842-44.
208. Id. at 84142.
209. See id. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
210. See id. at 849-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
211. See id. at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. See id. at 850-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In this regard, Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Rosenberger was reminiscent of her opinion in Capitol Square Review and Advi-
sory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). In her separate opinion in Pinette, Justice
O'Connor argued that the Capitol Square" Review and Advisory Board could not justify
denying the KKK a permit to place a cross on Capitol Square, not only because the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment generally required the government to adopt a
neutral policy with regard to the substance of a speaker's message, but also because no
reasonable person would have ascribed the message communicated by the Klan's cross
to the State of Ohio. See id. at 783 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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who objected to paying for the printing of Wide Awake theoreti-
cally could receive a partial rebate from the SAF.213 In Justice
O'Connor's mind, these factors dissociated the state from the
newspaper enough to deprive the University of a legitimate basis
for denying funding to the students. 214
d. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Souter, joined by three other justices, disagreed sharply
with the majority, describing the holding as the Supreme Court's
first approval of "direct funding of core religious activities by an
arm of the State." 215 In making this argument, he reiterated clas-
sic separationist principles. In Justice Souter's eyes, Wide Awake's
message was distinctly unlike that of any ordinary organ of "stu-
dent news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic
communicatio[n] "216 -the activities that the University sought to
encourage with funding from the SAF. Instead, Justice Souter saw
Wide Awake's struggle as distinctively religious and not merely in
an academic sense:
The subject is not the discourse of the scholar's study or the
seminar room, but of the evangelist's mission station and the
pulpit. It is nothing other than the preaching of the word,
which (along with the sacraments) is what most branches of
Christianity offer those called to the religious life.
21 7
For Justice Souter, the distinction between speech about relig-
ion and "the preaching of the word" made all the difference. 21 8
He argued that requiring the University to apportion money
from the SAF to Wide Awake fell squarely within the Establish-
ment Clause's prohibition of the direct subsidies of religious
practice and propagation.2 19 He supported this argument by re-
ferring to Virginia's experiences during the revolutionary and
post-revolutionary period.220 With this history in mind, Justice
213. See Rosenbergr, 515 U.S. at 851-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
214. See id. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 863 (Souter, J., dissenting).
216. I. at 867-68 (Souter, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
218. Justice White made a similar argument in his dissent in Widmar v. Vmncen 454
U.S. 263 (1981) (White, J., dissenting), that there is a constitutionally significant differ-
ence between speech "about religion" and acts or words of devotion. Id. at 284 (White,
J., dissenting). Like Justice White, Justice Souter discerned such an operative difference
in Rosenberger. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting).
219. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 868-72 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Souter concluded that the majority's holding was flatly inconsis-
tent with the clear mandate of the Constitution.
221
The crux of Justice Souter's contention was that the majority
had confused the "basic rule" of the Establishment Clause-the
prohibition on direct aid to religion-with its "marginal crite-
rion"-the requirement of neutrality when affirmative aid inures
to the benefit of religion.222 Thus, Justice Souter called for a
zone of activity from which all government programs, including
programs of general applicability, would be excluded. According
to Justice Souter; the mere fact that including WAP within the
SAF was a "neutral" act, although "relevant," was not dispositive
because the Supreme Court should have gone on to ask whether
opening the SAF to Wide Awake would cause public money to go
to the support of religion. 223 If the majority had addressed this
question, he argued, it would have upheld the University's deci-
sion. In fact, he noted, the majority itself had half-recognized the
necessity of looking beyond mere neutrality-by taking pains to
distinguish a student activities fee from a tax and by noting that
no money would flow directly from the government to WAP 24 --
but had failed to draw the necessary conclusions.
According to Justice Souter, the fact that students' money
would bypass WAP on its way to the printer was irrelevant be-
cause Wide Awake would be receiving public money in its capacity
as an evangelical newspaper.225 He saw this as distinct from in-
stances in which the Supreme Court had upheld schemes pursu-
ant to which public money ultimately ended up in the hands of
religious entities. In those cases, Justice Souter argued, the gov-
ernment had made money available to private parties on the ba-
sis of neutral criteria, just as it would in paying its employees,
and those parties had then elected, as private citizens, to forward
this money to religious entities. 226
221. See id. at 873-74 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 878-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 877-78 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court focuses on a subsidiary
body of law, which it correctly states but ultimately misapplies.").
224. See id. at 864-65 (Souter, J., dissenting).
225. See id. at 886-87 (Souter, J., dissenting).
226. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983); Zobrest v. Cata-
lina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2467-69 (1993)).
1138 [Vol. 65
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
e. The Significance of Rosenberger
The Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger may have de-
pended critically upon the facts of the case, as Justice O'Connor
suggested. If this is true, then Rosenberger is evidence that the Su-
preme Court has adopted a contextual approach to the Religion
Clauses.2 7 If so, the proper question for critical review would be
whether the factors in the Supreme Court's analysis-either
those adduced by Justice Kennedy for the majority or those ad-
duced by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence-are accurately
perceived and persuasively relevant. If, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court's decision in Rosenberger portends a blanket adop-
tion of a radical equal-access approach to nonestablishment, the
argument surely fails that strict separationism has carried the day
in the interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
D. Summary
I have attempted to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has
not successfully resolved the ambiguity left by the founders re-
garding the nature of religious liberty in the United States. Al-
though Everson's opening dictum was separationist, the decision
in that case ultimately turned upon a balancing of equal-access,
free-exercise, and separationist principles. Moreover, it was this
balancing test, not Everson's strict separationist dictum, that ulti-
mately evolved into the longstanding test for adjudicating dis-
putes under the Establishment Clause, the three-part test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman. In fact, aside from decisions involving relig-
ion and the public schools, the Supreme Court has never em-
braced anything close to strict separationist principles. In addi-
tion, the accommodation line of cases cannot be reconciled with
227. Another decision, handed down after Rosenberger, that appears to reflect a con-
textual approach to nonestablishment is Agostini v. Felton, decided in 1997. See 117 S. Ct.
1997. In Agostini, the Supreme Court upheld New York City's practice of assigning mu-
nicipal employees to provide remedial education in private, sectarian schools. In so do-
ing, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985),
that the practice constituted an establishment of religion. See id. at 413. Although the
Supreme Court in Agostini more or less subjected New York's practice to the three
prongs of Lemon, see Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2101, 2014-15, its analysis rested on a some-
what case-specific evaluation of the impact of the program and the likely behavior of
public employees in a sectarian environment. See id. at 2010-16. Of course, whenever a
case turns on Lemon's second prong, the critical question is whether the practice at issue
has a religious effect that exceeds its secular effect. This would appear to call for a chal-
lenging, if not impossible, empirical analysis. Thus, even Lemon can be contextual, as
long as the practice at issue has a secular purpose and some secular effect.
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any version of separationism, ranging from the strict separation-
ism of Everson's dictum to the modest separationism of such va-
ried decisions as Everson itself, Lemon, Widmar, Lamb's Chape, Pi-
nette, or Rosenberger. Moreover, the equal-access line of decisions
not only draws upon principles, such as equality and free exer-
cise, that require a flexible version of separationism, but this line
of decisions, if carried to its logical limits, would undermine al-
most any notion of separationism. Finally, the divergence of
opinion in such recent decisions as Pinette and Rosenberge" empha-
sizes the failure of any coherent formal interpretive maxim for
the Establishment Clause to emerge in the modern era. Conse-
quently, it is not persuasive to argue that the Supreme Court has
resolved the ambiguity left by the founders to the satisfaction of
the polity.228 Instead, that ambiguity is still with us, as a matter of
constitutional doctrine and as a matter of political culture. 229 In
other words, the Supreme Court has never completely embraced
separationism.
IV. CONTEXTUAL APPROACHES TO NONESTABLISHMENT
In light of the failure of strict separationism or of any other
formal interpretation of the Religion Clauses to capture the de-
bate, a contextual approach to nonestablishment may be the
only feasible course. Moreover, such a course may better serve
the underlying needs of much or all of the populace in terms of
religious growth. In Part IV-A, I will discuss some of the contex-
228. Lemon, for example, has been challenged on a number of fronts, including the
home front. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our Re-
ligion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to speak) by reliance on for-
mulaic abstractions that are not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-
accepted constitutional traditions. Foremost among these has been the so-called Lemon
test. . . ."). See also McConnell, supra note 7, at 1-2, ("The much-discussed 'tension' be-
tween the two Religion Clauses largely arises from the Court's substitution of a mislead-
ing formula (the three-part Lemon test . . .) and subsidiary, instrumental, values (espe-
cially separation of church and state) in place of the central value of religious liberty.").
229. As Franklin Gamwell writes:
[T]he Republic has never been more uncertain about the relation between
politics and religion to which it is committed. Roughly speaking, there is a
persistent division between contemporary separationists and contemporary
religionists. For the former, the constitutional disestablishment of religion
means that religious convictions are properly separated from the activities
of the state; for the latter, the constitutional protection of religious exercise
means that religious conviction is essential to civic virtue and the well-being
of the civil order. Both positions endorse the First Amendment, but neither
has been able to persuade the other that it does so consistently.
Gamwell, supra note 4, at 3.
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tual approaches to the Religion Clauses that have been pro-
posed.230 Then, in Part IV-B, I will identify and concede some
weaknesses to contextual analysis, yet conclude that courts none-
theless should use such analysis.231 Finally, in Part IV-C, I will ar-
gue that a contextual approach best protects the innate human
need for religion.232
A. Some Proposals
Notwithstanding the formalism of many of the Warren- and
Burger-era decisions involving the Establishment and Free Exer-
cise Clauses, even then members of the Supreme Court occasion-
ally indicated a preference for flexible interpretation of the Re-
ligion Clauses. Dissenting from the Supreme Court's 1963
decision Abington School District v. Schempp, for instance, Justice
Stewart called for a less "sterile" or "wooden" interpretation of
the Establishment Clause than that adopted by the majority.
233
Moreover, such an approach was arguably implicit in such ac-
commodationist decisions as Zorach, Walz, and Marsh v. Cham-
bers.234 In fact, a sophisticated jurist armed only with Lemon could
arguably apply the Religion Clauses contextually. In recent years,
however, contextual tests have played an increasingly important,
although perhaps not authoritative, role in Establishment Clause
doctrine. In this subpart, I will briefly describe several different,
but nevertheless contextual, approaches to nonestablishment.
Specifically, these are Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" teSt,235
Justice Kennedy's "coercion" test,236 which echoed a test set forth
by Michael McConnell some time before,237 and Alan Schwarz's
"no imposition" rule.2 38 In this subpart, I will also briefly discuss
Michael McConnell's three rules for "permissible accommoda-
tions" of religion by government, which reflect the same basic
230. See infra notes 233-59 and accompanying text.
231. See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 261"86 and accompanying text.
233. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 317. See generally Schwarz,
supra note 7, at 692.
234. 463 U.S. 783, 785 (1983) (allowing a state legislature to retain a chaplain). See
supra note 81 for a discussion of Marsh.
235. See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
237. See Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishmen 27 WM. &
MARY L REv. 933, 940 (1986).
238. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
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approach to nonestablishment. 239
Perhaps the most prominent advocate of a contextual ap-
proach to the Establishment Clause has been Justice O'Connor.
Her proposals have taken both a general and a specific form. As
a general matter, she has advocated a "decentralization" of Es-
tablishment Clause doctrine, calling for a number of tests imple-
menting the Clause, each designed to address a specific subject
matter.240 Specifically, she has often promoted an endorsement
test, according to which the interpretive maxim for the Establish-
ment Clause would be "whether government's purpose is to en-
dorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message
of endorsement."24'
Justice O'Connor first set forth this test in a concurring opin-
ion in Lynch v. Donnelly.24 2 In Lynch, the issue was whether a mu-
nicipality could maintain a Christmas display on a privately
owned park. The display included a nativity scene, as well as a
number of secular symbols associated with Christmas. The Su-
preme Court, with Chief Justice Burger writing for the majority,
essentially applied Lemon and allowed the display, reasoning that
its purpose and primary effect were to promote the secular na-
ture of the Christmas holidays, not their religious nature. 243 Al-
though Justice O'Connor joined the opinion of the Supreme
Court, she wrote separately, calling for a refinement of Lemon.
Specifically, she argued that the prongs of the test should be
thought of in terms of their value in assessing the impact of offi-
cial practices on people's religious identity and not abstractly.244
According to Justice O'Connor, the central question in an Estab-
lishment Clause dispute should be whether the practice being
239. See infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2499 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor stated:
[A]nother danger to keep in mind is that the bad test may drive out the
good. Rather than taking the opportunity to derive narrower, more precise
tests from the case law, courts tend to continually try to patch up the broad
test, making it more and more amorphous and distorted. This, I am afraid,
has happened with Lemon.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). She further
stated that "[t]he hard questions would, of course, still have to be asked; but they will
be asked within a more carefully tailored and less distorted framework." See id. at 2500
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
241. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
243. See id. at 681, 683.
244. See id. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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challenged "makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community."
245
Like Justice, O'Connor, Justice Kennedy has advocated a con-
textual coercion test for violations of the Establishment Clause,
although his test appears to have a higher threshold before offi-
cial action is deemed to violate the Clause than Justice
O'Connor's test. Justice Kennedy's first articulation of this test
was in a separate opinion in Allegheny County v. ACLU, Greater
Pittsburgh Chapter.246 One of the main issues in this case was
whether a private group could display a creche on the main
staircase of a county courthouse. The Supreme Court held that it
could not, due to the absence of secular iconography to detract
from the religious message of the display.247 Dissenting from this
portion of the Supreme Court's holding, Justice Kennedy argued
that mere "passive displays," such as the one at issue in the case,
did not violate the Establishment Clause because they posed no
real risk of infringing on freedom of religion.248 Specifically, Jus-
tice Kennedy argued:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise; and it may not in the guise of avoiding hostility or cal-
lous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a de-
gree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so."249
Similarly, Justice Kennedy argued in his opinion for the Su-
preme Court in Lee v. Weisman 50 that the important question in
an Establishment Clause case is whether the government has "co-
erced" an individual "to support or participate in religion or its
exercise. ' 251 In that case, the issue was whether a public high
school could have a rabbi deliver a nondenominational prayer at
the opening of commencement ceremonies. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, ruled that it
245. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Supreme Court appeared to
fold her test into Lemon in the later case of Allegheny County v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989).
246. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
247. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 598, 601-02.
248. See id, at 662, 664-65 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
249. See id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
250. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
251. See id. at 587.
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could not. In striking down the practice, the Weisman Court
neither invoked nor even mentioned Lemon. Instead, the five jus-
tices who formed the majority simply agreed that high school
students who were uncomfortable with the prayer and who were
given the option to leave the ceremony during the prayer might
feel "coerced" into adopting a religious practice in order to
avoid feeling excluded from the ceremony.
252
In 1968, Alan Schwarz argued that courts should interpret the
Establishment Clause to prohibit official aid to religion that has
as its "motive or substantial effect the imposition of religious be-
lief or practice .... "253 This focus upon the "imposition" of re-
ligion closely resembles Justice Kennedy's focus upon "coercion,"
and, in fact, the two standards may be the same. Finally, Michael
McConnell has argued with respect to permissible accommoda-
tions of religion by government254-that is, practices that are not
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause but that accommodate re-
ligion-that such practices do not violate the Establishment
Clause as long as they "facilitate the exercise of beliefs and prac-
tices independently adopted rather than inducing or coercing
beliefs or practices acceptable to the government,"255 do not "in-
terfere with the religious liberty of others by forcing them to par-
ticipate in religious observance," 256 and do not "favor one form
of religious belief over another. ' 257 Although McConnell pro-
posed these principles as means of deciding whether voluntary
practices of governments violate the Establishment Clause, they
suggest a contextual approach to evaluating any government
practice regarding religion and, in that sense, resemble the tests
advocated by Schwarz and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
I will not argue that these tests are the same, but they share
important characteristics. In particular, they share the character-
istic of focusing on the objectively foreseeable impact of an offi-
cial practice on individual religious growth. In doing this, these
tests both reflect voluntarism and contemplate the possibility of
atheism. Moreover, they can be distinguished from tests that do
252. See id. at 593-96.
253. Schwarz, supra note 7, at 693 (" [The Establishment Clause] should be read to
prohibit only aid which has as its motive or substantial effect the imposition of religious
belief or practice[,] and ... the Supreme Court's decisions and much of its language
are consistent with this proposed standard.").
254. McConnell, supra note 7, at 34-41.
255. Id. at 35.
256. Id. at 37.
257. Id. at 39.
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not ask how specific practices actually affect people. 25 In this re-
spect, these tests are conceptually similar to tests for negligence
based upon what a reasonable person would do in particular
circumstances2 59
B. Some Weaknesses
The weaknesses of a contextual approach to the Establishment
Clause are manifold and come easily to mind. Perhaps most obvi-
ous is the abstract position that the separation of church and
state is both a formal and a desirable imperative of the Establish-
ment Clause. I have attempted to demonstrate the failure of the
interpretive aspect of this argument in Part III of this paper, and
I will attempt to address the failure of its political aspect in Part
IV-C.
Another potent criticism is that officials will never know the
meaning of the Establishment Clause and will be exposed to con-
stant litigation. Similarly, a legal Platonist might object to the
Constitution forbidding a specific practice in one context, but
not in another. Although there is merit to these arguments,
there are also responses. First, if the subject is sufficiently impor-
tant, there is virtue in getting the right answer. If religion is
thought of as an elective endeavor, no more important to its ad-
herents than athletics or preservation of the mailbox rule, it fol-
lows that a clear rule easily administered by local magistrates
would be preferable. However, if, as I have argued, religion is a
defining aspect of character, the importance of arriving at the
best decision practically achievable heightens. The difficulty of
combatting alcoholism without such quasi-religious organizations
such as A.A. supports this line of thought. Moreover, I attempted
to demonstrate in Part III of this Article that, notwithstanding
years of effort, the Supreme Court itself has failed to establish
coherent uniform rules for the Religion Clauses. As I have
noted, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause do
not necessarily leave room for each other, at least as the Su-
258. Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct govern-
mental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or
not.").
259. In fact, Justice O'Connor argued in terms of a "reasonable person" in her sep-
arate opinion in Pinette, and other justices responded to her argument. See supra note
186.
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preme Court has interpreted them. Consequently, officials and
courts have no real alternative but to try to understand what the
two Clauses together are meant to do and to remain mindful of
that deeper meaning, deciding cases in context, with an eye to-
ward the actual impact of official practices on private choices
and growth. Over time, arguably, rules will emerge that will work
and that will aggregate with other rules to establish clear, tested
doctrine.260 In other words, if the Religion Clauses are really in-
tended to protect religious growth but, beyond that, not to inter-
fere with official practices, timeless doctrine is not a worthwhile
goal. Assuming that neither the text of the Constitution nor judi-
cial propriety prohibits a contextual approach to the Establish-
ment Clause, I will now argue that such an approach may com-
port better with psychology and theology than separationism.
C. Squarely Addressing Theology and Psychology
I have argued that the intentions behind the Religion Clauses
neither precluded nor required modest, even-handed association
between church and state. I have further argued that the prac-
tices of the founding generation after ratification of the Religion
Clauses confirms the existence of this leeway. Finally, I have ar-
gued that the Supreme Court's abortive attempts to resolve this
ambiguity in favor of strict separation have demonstrated the dif-
ficulty of such a resolution. I will now attempt to argue with ref-
erence to nonlegal sources that there may be theological and
psychological reasons why such a resolution may not be
advisable.
As the historian Christopher Dawson has argued, people in an-
cient cultures had little, if any, difficulty imagining a world popu-
lated by forces beyond their control or understanding-forces
that may otherwise be described as gods. 261 Consequently, they
did not readily distinguish between religion and such other so-
cial phenomena as education, 262 medicine,263 charity,264 and even
260. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 721
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
261. See CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE AGE OF THE GODS 22-23 (1928) ("[T]he study of
primitive culture is intimately bound up with that of primitive religion.... Wherever
and whenever man has a sense of dependence on external powers which are conceived
as mysterious and higher than man's own, there is religion, and the feelings of awe and
self-abasement with which man is filled in the presence of such powers is essentially a
religious emotion, the root of worship and prayer.").
262. Virtually all universities and schools began as centers of religious study, and
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politics. Military campaigns, migrations, or the location of vil-
lages, for instance, often depended upon divine instruction, or
what was perceived as divine instruction.
265
Needless to say, the world has changed since then. The psy-
choanalyst Carl Jung, for instance, argued that the mental state
with which we are most familiar, consciousness, gradually
emerged during and after the period of which Dawson wrote.
2 "
Similarly, another psychoanalyst, Erik Erickson, suggested that
the first expression of the modem psyche was by Martin Luther,
who was courageous enough in 1520 to oppose dogma that
many still are. See, e.g., 1 WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 54 ("To shew the advan-
tages of these incorporations, let us consider the case of a college in either of our uni-
versities, founded ad studendum et orandur, for the encouragement and support of relig-
ion and learning.").
263. Medicine and religion have a long history of being essentially the same thing.
SeeJUNG, C.W., supra note 2, at 102-04 at 1 230-31 ("Modern therapy is not much aware
of this, but in ancient medicine it was well known that the raising of the personal dis-
ease to a higher and more impersonal level had a curative effect"), and millions of peo-
ple recognize the possibility of healing by faith. The writers of Alcoholics Anonymous, the
"Big Book" of the A.A. program, similarly claim that, although alcoholism is an illness,
the appropriate treatment for it is essentially spiritual. See ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
WORLD SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 18, 25 (1955) [hereinafter ALCOHOLICS
ANONYMous].
264. Charity is mandated and even institutionalized by many religious traditions.
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5J.L & RE-
LIGION 65, 66 (1987) ("The basic word of Judaism is obligation or mitzvah."). See also 1
John 3:17-18.
265. See generally DANIEL J. GARGOLA, LANDS, LAwS & GODS: MAGISTRATES & CEREMONY
IN THE REGULATION OF PUBuC LANDS IN REPUBLCAN ROME 4 (1995). The author stated
that
[a]ny examination of Roman government in action leads immediately to
the practices, concepts, and terms of the state religion and to a wide variety
of ritual. Both permeated public life. The Greek historian Polybius . . . ex-
pressed puzzlement over the degree to which the Romans had turned their
religious observances into rites and the extent to which these formalities
entered into public and private life. These same formal attributes, moreo-
ver, also characterized many seemingly secular operations. An investigation
into the concrete process of administration, therefore, is also a study of the
place of ritual and of religion in Rome's public life.
Id.
When Carl Jung asked certain East Africans about their dreams, they replied that
they did not dream, for that was the prerogative of their leaders. One of their leaders
then explained to Jung that he did not dream either because there was now a colonial
administrator in the district, who told the people where to live and who knew every-
thing about war and diseases. For these people, Jung argued, "dreams were formerly the
supreme political guide, the voice of Mungu, 'God.'" 11 C.G. JUNG, THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF C.G. JUNG 18, 30 (emphasis in original) (Sir Herbert Read et al. eds., 2d ed.
1969) (hereinafter JUNG, (2d ed.)). See asoJUNG, C.W., supra note 2, at 111-12, 250 (dis-
cussing the exegesis of dreams with a religious theme in other ancient political fora).
266. SeeJUNG, C.W., supra note 2, at 193-94, 1 439-40.
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served as the fabric of western existence. 267
The western world, however, has not pulled off this emergence
flawlessly. Jung argued that, as we came to understand and to ob-
jectify nature, the world came to be no longer full of gods. In-
stead, our image of a deity gradually retreated to deep within us,
largely beyond our conscious selves. 268 This, in turn, permitted,
or even required, us to deny the role of religion as part of the
human experience.269 Consequently, as Warren Nord argues:
[W]e have separated the sacred and the secular. Most of us
no longer believe that religious ideas and values are integral to
our understanding of history and nature, psychology and soci-
ety, the economy and politics. As Wilfred Cantwell Smith put it,
religious traditions that were once "coterminous with human
life in all its comprehensiveness, have actually found themselves
supplemented more and more by considerations from other or
newer sources, so that the religious seems to be one fact of a
person's life alongside others."270
However, as Jung and others have argued, such denial or repudi-
ation of religion as part of the human experience is not necessa-
rily healthy because, after all, we may need some image of a god:
It seems dangerous for such a man [as Nietzsche] to assert that
"God is dead": he instantly becomes the victim of inflation. Far
from being a negation, God is actually the strongest and most
effective "position" the psyche can reach, in exactly the same
sense in which Paul speaks of people "whose God is in their
belly." The strongest and therefore the decisive factor in any in-
dividual psyche compels the same belief or fear, submission or
devotion which a God would demand from man.271
267. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER: A STUDY IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HIS-
TORY 194-95 (1958).
268. See 11 JUNG (2d ed.), supra note 265, at 82-83, 1 140.
269. See 12 JUNG, (2d ed.), supra note 265, at 50-52, 60. Jung wrote:
The resistance of the conscious mind to the unconscious and the deprecia-
tion of the latter were historical necessities in the development of the
human psyche, for otherwise the conscious mind would never have been
able to differentiate itself at all. But modern man's consciousness has
strayed rather too far from the fact of the unconscious. We have even for-
gotten that the psyche is by no means of our design, but is for the most
part autonomous and unconscious.
Id. at 50, 60.
270. WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL
DILEMMA 41 (1995) (quoting WILFRED C. SMITH, THE MEANING AND END OF RELIGION 113-14
(1964) (emphasis removed).
271, JUNG (2d ed.), supra note 265, at 85-86, 1 142 (citations omitted). Similarly, in
SYMBOLS AND THE INTERPRETATIONS OF DREAMS, published in 1961, Jung wrote:
[Iln our time there are countless people who have lost faith in one or
1148 [Vol. 65
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According to Jung, who devoted much of his professional life to
the care of patients, religions are metaphors for the development
of the psyche. For his purposes, it mattered less whether his pa-
tients embraced a particular religion than whether they somehow
authentically participated in the process that he identified as dis-
tinctly human and critical to the psyche's proper development.
. Jung's approach to religion offers a valuable perspective on
the debate over the proper scope of the Establishment Clause.
Instead of concentrating in the abstract on what the Constitution
requires, knowing that the Constitution offers considerable lee-
way, Jung's approach suggests that we should think in terms of
what people require. Moreover, Jung's approach has the advan-
tage of not advocating on behalf of traditional religion per se,
except where traditional religion presents itself as authentic to a
particular individual.2 2 In fact, Jung's statements bear some rela-
tion to the idea of voluntarism that permeated the founding
generation.
273
other of the world religions. They do not understand them any longer.
While life runs smoothly, the loss remains as good as unnoticed. But when
suffering comes, things change very rapidly. One seeks the way out and be-
gins to reflect about the meaning of life and its bewildering exper-
iences. . . . People feel that it makes, or would make, a great difference if
only they had a positive belief in a meaningful way of life or in God and
immortality. The spectre of death looming up before them often gives a
powerful incentive to such thoughts. From time immemorial, men have
had ideas about a Supreme Being (one or several) and about the Land of
the Hereafter. Only modem man thinks he can do without them. Because
he cannot discover God's throne in heaven with a telescope or radar, or es-
tablish for certain that dear father or mother are still about in a more or
less corporeal form, he assumes such ideas are not "true." I would rather
say that they are not "true" enough. They have accompanied human life
since prehistoric times and are still ready to break through into conscious-
ness at the slightest provocation.
JUNG. C.W., supra note 2, at 246, 565.
272. SeeJUNG (2d ed.), supra note 265, at 45, 79 ("I reinforce a means of defence
against a grave risk, without asking the academic question whether the defence is an ul-
timate truth. I am glad when it works and so long as it works.").
273. The following excerpt from a discussion that took place after Jung lectured to
the Guild of Pastoral Psychology in London in 1939 is illustrative of his thinking on this
subject:
The Bishop of Southwant
What are we to do with the great majority of people we have to deal
with who are not in any church? ...
ProfessorJung.
I am afraid you can't do anything with such people. The Church is
there and is valid for those who are inside. Those who are outside the walls
of the Church cannot be brought back into the Church by the ordinary
means .... I wish that a new generation of clergymen would come in and
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In light of observations like those made by Jung, it can be ar-
gued that the project of "secularizing" a society or "privatizing"
religion is far more easily said than done. In fact, as John Garvey
and Alan Schwarz have argued, the treatment of religion as
"elective" is both theologically offensive and, because of the ex-
tent of governmental activity in the twentieth century, potentially
oppressive for many. Consequently, the privatization of religion
in the era of positive government arguably violates many of the
principles of religious liberty identified by Witte.
Garvey touches on this issue in the context of evaluating what
he describes as "the autonomy theory" of religious freedom. Ac-
cording to this theory, the value of religious freedom is that it af-
fords the individual maximum authority to choose a particular
religion, or no religion at all.274 In fact, Garvey argues, the essen-
tial value in the autonomy model is not the quality of the out-
come, but the existence of the choice.2 75 He maintains, however,
that this view is predicated on an assumption about human na-
ture that we are able to withdraw from our convictions and
desires and reorganize them according to more deeply held pref-
erences, referred to by Garvey as "second-order preferences,"
that we freely choose.276 However, Garvey argues that this
assumption:
do the same as they do in the Catholic Church: that they would try to
translate the language of the unconscious, even the language of dreams,
into proper language. [There is a member of a German liturgical move-
ment who] has given me quite a number of instances, which I am able to
check, where he translated the figures of dreams into dogmatic language
with the greatest success, and these people quietly slipped back into the or-
der of the Church. . . .Several of my patients became Catholics, others
went back into the Church organization. But it must be something that has
substance and form. It is by no means true that when one analyses some-
body he necessarily jumps into the future. He is perhaps meant for a
church, and if he can go back into a church, perhaps that it is the best




Then there is trouble; then he has to go on the Quest; then he has to
find out what his soul says; then he has to go through the solitude of land
that is not created.
JUNG, C.W., supra note 2, at 284-85, 11 670-73. Jung also described his own inability to
find meaning in traditional religious dogma. See id. at 276, 1 632.
274. See GAtavE, supra note 48, at 44-45.
275. See id. at 45.
276. Id. at 44.
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is inconsistent in several ways with recurring ideas in Christian
theology. The notion of original sin is meant to suggest the in-
herent imperfection of human nature. In the strongest state-
ments of this idea-Augustine's-is a good example-it entails
our inability to master sinful desires and to freely will doing
good. In the common phrase, human nature is the slave of sin.
The counterpoint to this unhappy view of human nature is the
idea of grace. It is a kind of sharing in divine life, a power that
enables us to control sinful desire, live good lives, and win sal-
vation. But grace is given to us by God gratuitously.. . .It is
out of our control. This aspect of grace, followed to its logical
conclusion, leads to the Calvinist notion of predestination: our
salvation is entirely in God's hands, and some are not saved.
2 17
Adherents to this sort of faith, Garvey argues, would reject the
kind of "choice" underlying the autonomy model because the
choice is not as much the individual's as God's. As he puts it, "I
might have to accept God's choice and cooperate in carrying it
out, but I am cast as a supporting actor."27 Garvey concludes
that, for those who take this view of human nature, the "free-
dom" to run one's life according to elective second-order prefer-
ences is not true freedom. "It sounds paradoxical," Garvey
writes, "but it is accurate to say that Christian freedom consists
not in making our own choices but in obeying the law of
God." 27 9 In light of Garvey's observation, we should hesitate to
adopt an approach to the Religion Clauses that trivializes the
deeply held beliefs of some-or many.
Similarly, Schwarz argues that ignoring the theological source
of social or personal imperatives or suggesting an alternative, sec-
ular source trivializes, and may even deny, theological explana-
tions. "Religion," he writes, "is most necessary, and hence most
believable, when it provides the sole explanation for all phenom-
ena. A system which provides answers without reference to relig-
277. I. at 45 (internal footnotes omitted). Compare Jung:
[W]e are so used to the idea that psychic events are wilful and arbitrary
products, or even the inventions of a human creator, that we can hardly rid
ourselves of the prejudiced view that the psyche and its contents are noth-
ing but our own arbitrary invention or the more or less illusory product of
supposition and judgment. The fact is that certain ideas exist almost every-
where and at all times and can even spontaneously create themselves quite
independently of migration and tradition. They are not made by the indi-
vidual, they just happen to him-they even force themselves on his con-
sciousness. This is not Platonic philosophy but empirical psychology.
JUNG (2d ed.), supra note 265, at 7, 5.
278. GARvEY, supra note 48, at 46.
279. Id.
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ion or which teaches that there are no answers makes religion
less necessary, and hence less believable."
280
Garvey and Schwarz make distinct, but related, arguments.
Garvey argues that the government must in some instances sup-
port religion because treating religion as purely elective is in
some respects derogatory toward religion. Similarly, Schwarz sug-
gests that prolonged exposure to coherent explanations of phe-
nomena that exclude supernatural explanations ultimately dispar-
ages such explanations.
The theological arguments made by Garvey and Schwarz un-
derscore the importance in the lives of at least some people-
and Jung might argue all people--of retaining a connection to
the nonsecular and of believing somehow that that connection is
more than "elective" as an economist might use the word. As
Garvey puts it, the bottom line of the Religion- Clauses must be
that "God [i]s [g]ood."281 But, if Garvey and Schwarz are correct,
then strict separation, which will not permit government aid to
religion in general, is antithetical for theological reasons to many
of the principles embraced by the founders as essential to the
American experiment in religious liberty.
Moreover, if Garvey and Schwarz are correct, it is not a persua-
sive response that only government is precluded from supporting
religion because modern, positive government is not just a
"posse" put together to solve a particular problem, but embraces
vast amounts of social territory in which religion formerly played
a primary role, such as in education, medicine, and charity.22 As
Schwarz argues with respect to the exclusion of religious ideas
from the public school curriculum: "Ignoring the theological
source of the imperative-and, worse, supplying an alternative
secular source-tends to belittle, perhaps even negate, the
theological. 28
3
280. Schwarz, supra note 7, at 700-01.
281. GARVEY, supra note 48, at 42.
282. As Justice Kennedy argued in Allegheny County.
In this century, as the modem administrative state expands to touch the
lives of its citizens in such diverse ways and redirects their financial choices
through programs of its own, it is difficult to maintain the fiction that re-
quiring government to avoid all assistance to religion can in fairness be
viewed as serving the goal of neutrality.
Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
283. Schwarz, supra note 7, at 700 (footnote omitted). See also James Hitchcock,
Church, State, and Moral Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, in LAW AND REUGION 155,
165 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 1992) ("If the schools are regarded as helping to shape the
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Marsh v. Alabama 284 provides an analogy for the argument that
an expanding public sector may be obligated to support religion.
In Marsh, the Supreme Court held that the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation, the owner of a company town, Chickasaw, was sub-
ject to requirements of the Constitution that govern only state
entities, even though the corporation was privately owned. The
Supreme Court reasoned that, when a private entity undertakes
to provide virtually all of the services ordinarily associated with
the state-such as streets and utilities-that entity also acquires
the obligation to observe strictures that apply to the state-such
as the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.285 It could simi-
larly be argued that, by taking over many of the functions tradi-
tionally associated with and constitutive of religion-such as edu-
cation, medicine and charity-the government acquires some
obligation to accommodate religion within its own activities. In
fact, there is an example of the government upholding the kind
of constructive obligation to aid religion that I suggest in the
practice of retaining military chaplains. These individuals are
paid with tax dollars and directly support religion, but their pres-
ence on the federal payroll arguably does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because the retention of chaplains compensates
for the government's isolation of soldiers from ordinary religious
connections.
In sum,.we surely have a problem if what people require and
what the Establishment Clause permits are in opposition. This
question, I submit, is presented in the A.A. cases.
286
child's total world, then the exclusion of religion cannot help but shape a religionless
world. At the most formative period of their lives, children are in effect taught that re-
ligion is unimportant or even perhaps false.").
284. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
285. See id. at 506-08.
286. Ironically, according to the "Big Book" of AA, Jung was unable to treat suc-
cessfully one of the pioneering members of the program. See ALCOHOuCS ANONYMOUS,
supra note 263, at 26-27. The Big Book contains the following conversation between
Jung and the patient:
The doctor said: "You have the mind of a chronic alcoholic. I have
never seen a single case recover, where that state of mind existed to the ex-
tent that it does in you." . . .
He said to the doctor, "Is there no exception?"
"Yes," replied the doctor, "there is. Exceptions to cases such as yours
have been occurring since early times. Here and there, once in a while, al-
coholics have had what are called, vital spiritual experiences. To me these
occurrences are phenomena. They appear to be in the nature of huge
emotional displacements and rearrangements.... In fact, I have been try-
ing to produce some such emotional rearrangement within you."
Id. at 27.
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V. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS
A. Public Resort to A.A.
Many jurisdictions in the United States routinely refer con-
victed misdemeanants and felons, as well as others dependent
upon the state, to support groups if they demonstrate signs of al-
cohol or drug abuse.2 17 Often, the support program is A.A., or a
program modeled on A.A., Narcotics Anonymous. Although
there are other programs, A.A. is essentially free of charge,288 by
far the most available, and, at least in terms of the number of
participants, the most successful. 289 People who fail to participate
in the appropriate program are often incarcerated, denied a li-
cense or privilege, 290 or, if they are already behind bars, sub-
jected to extended incarceration. 291 Thus, subtle pressure by the
state often lies behind individual decisions to participate in A.A.
and similar programs.
292
287. See, e.g., CAL CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 9860 (1992) (amended 1995) (permitting in-
dividual counties to require an "additional program" for individuals convicted of drunk
driving offenses, which may, in some circumstances, include such self-help programs as
Alcoholics Anonymous). See also Michael G. Honeymar, Akoholics Anonymous as a Condi-
tion of Drunk Driving Probation: Wien Does It Amount to Fstablishment of Religion, 97 COLUM.
L. REV. 437, 468-71 (1997) (describing California's new requirement that counties that
list A.A. as a possible "additional program" must list nonsectarian alternatives). Cf Staf-
ford v. Harrison, 766 E Supp. 1014, 1015 (D. Kan. 1991) (describing a decision by the
Kansas Parole Board to continue holding an inmate in custody pending his completion
of a treatment program for alcohol and drug abuse that incorporated the principles of
both Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous).
288. The "Preamble" of A.A., which is read at many meetings, includes a statement
that "there are no dues or fees for A-A.; the only requirement for membership is a de-
sire to stop drinking." TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra note 16, at 160.
There are voluntary collections, however. The Seventh Tradition of A.A. provides that
"Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-supporting, declining outside contributions." See
id.
289. According to at least one source, there are over 35,000 A.A. programs in the
United States, with over one million members. See Warner v. Orange County Dept. of
Probation, 827 E Supp. 261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
290. Cf Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 898, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (upholding an
administrative refusal to reinstate Youle's driving privileges on the grounds that Youle
refused to participate in a support program for alcoholism, although Youle was not obli-
gated to choose A.A. as a support program). Cooperation between bar and other profes-
sional associations and support groups such as A.A. is extensive.
291. Cf Stafford, 766 F. Supp. at 1015-16 (action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where an
inmate at a state prison was continued to be held in custody for failure to make pro-
gress in a treatment program incorporating the principles of A.A. and Narcotics
Anonymous).
292. The practice is often quite subtle. For example, probation officers, judges im-
posing sentences, bar examiners, and a variety of similar figures with authority to decide
the fate of individuals with respect to both trivial and important matters often may take
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Although A.A. is not a religion per se, and explicitly denies be-
ing one, 293 it bears many of the characteristics of religion and de-
pends on principles that not only translate easily from religion,
but that are themselves quintessentially religious.294 Conse-
quently, official pressure to participate in A.A. may run afoul of
Lemon because, if the primary effect of the government's action
is to provoke some form of religious conversion, a violation of
the Establishment Clause has occurred, even if the government's
intentions are purely secular.
Several courts have addressed the constitutionality of official
pressure to participate in A.A.; some uphold the pressure as con-
stitutional, and at least two courts have held that such pressure
violates the Establishment Clause.295 Although the facts of these
into account an individual's habit of attending AA. or his commitment to do so. See gen-
erally Christopher K. Smith, Note, State Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First Amendment
and Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation, 1 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTs. J. 299, 306 (1992) ("Although some DWI or rehabilitation statutes mandate cooper-
ation with AA or endorse AA principles, drunk drivers are not compelled to attend AA
by specific legislation. Rather, rules made pursuant to state drunk driving statutes create
a post-conviction system for determining the appropriate punishment and rehabilitation
for the drunk driver. These post-conviction evaluations determine whether the sentence
will include AM").
293. Cf TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TmtDmONS, supra note 16, at 26 (concerning the
second step of Alcoholics Anonymous: "Came to believe that a Power greater than our-
selves could restore us to sanity"):
Listen, if you will, to these three statements. First, Alcoholics Anonymous
does not demand that you believe anything. All of its Twelve Steps are but
suggestions. Second, to get sober and to stay sober, you don't have to swal-
low all of Step Two right now. Looking back, I find that I took it piecemeal
myself. Third, all you really need is a truly open mind. Just resign from the
debating society and quit bothering yourself with such deep questions as
whether it was the hen or the egg that came first.
Id.; see also ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, supra note 263, at 569-72.
The terms "spiritual experience" and "spiritual awakening" are used many
times in this book which, upon careful reading, shows that the personality
change sufficient to bring about recovery from alcoholism has manifested
itself among us in many different forms .... Among our rapidly growing
membership of thousands of alcoholics such transformations, though fre-
quent, are by no means the rule .... We find that no one need have diffi-
culty with the spirituality of the program. Willingness, honesty and open mind-
edness are the essentials of recovery.
Id. at 569-70.
294. For example, many A.A. meetings close with a recitation of the Lord's Prayer,
and the authors of the "Eleventh Step" of A.A., which involves prayer and meditation,
suggest use of the Prayer of Saint Francis, which begins "Lord, make me a channel of
thy peace. . . ." See infra notes 316-23 and accompanying text for a short discussion of
the religious aspects of A.A.
295. Compare O'Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 307-08 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (up-
holding a requirement that a person convicted of a multiple offense for driving under
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cases have differed in important respects, they have also illus-
trated a shortcoming of separationist doctrine--specifically, that,
in some instances, religion is such an important thing, either in-
strumentally or for its own sake, and government is so inextrica-
bly involved in people's lives, that government may have no real-
istic choice except to act with a general, positive view toward
religion, such as by advising A.A.
296
In instances like those presented in the A.A. cases, the Estab-
lishment Clause should be applied sparingly with attention to the
the influence participate in a county alcohol and drug education program as well as an
"additional program" that, because of logistics, was often A.A., on the grounds that the
primary purpose and effect of requiring attendance at an additional program was to
combat drunken driving, not to promote religion, that the requirement did not foster
excessive entanglements, and that at least one secular alternative to A.A., a program
called "Rational Recovery," was available); Stafford, 766 F. Supp. at 1017 (action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983) (upholding requirement that an inmate at a state prison participate
in a treatment program based on AA, reasoning that the requirement neither imposed
a religion upon him nor interfered with his practice of religion); Youle v. Edgar, 526
N.E.2d 894, 898, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (upholding an administrative refusal to rein-
state Youle's driving privileges on the grounds that Youle refused to participate in a sup-
port program for alcoholism, reasoning that the primary function of AA. is to combat
alcoholism, and that Youle was not obligated to choose A.A. as a support program); with
Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 108 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681
(1997) (holding that prison's requirement that an inmate participate in a twelve-step pro-
gram based upon A.A. in order to be eligible for a "Family Reunion Program" violated
the Establishment Clause); Warner v. Orange County Dept. of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068,
1074-75 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a state-imposed obligation to attend A.A. meetings
violated the Establishment Clause). The Second Circuit may have vacated the cited
opinion in Warner, see Orange County Dep't of Probation v. Warner, 968 F. Supp. 917, 918 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (mem.), but the district court seems to have complied with the tenor of
the Second Circuit's opinion on remand. See Warner, 969 F. Supp. at 923-24.
296. In other words, if one thinks of religion as a means of "making profoundly
good people,"whatever such an amorphous phrase means, the more government seeks
to reform the wayward, the more it will adopt religious practices (assuming other prac-
tices are less effective). With reference to Christianity, for example, the psychiatrist Ed-
win F. Edinger has argued that:
The image of Christ, and the rich network of symbolism which has gath-
ered around Him, provide many parallels to the individuation process. In
fact when the Christian myth is examined carefully in the light of analytical
psychology, the conclusion is inescapable that the underlying meaning of
Christianity is the quest for individuation.
Eoo AND ARCHETYPE 131 (1972). Similarly, John Garvey has argued that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause ultimately reflects a positive apprecia-
tion for religion:
[T]he religious justification is the only convincing explanation for the split-
level character of free exercise law. Sometimes religious believers and
nonbelievers are treated alike; but sometimes the law protects only religious
believers.... The only convincing explanation for such a rule is that the
law thinks religion is a good thing.
GARvEY, supra note 48, at 57.
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purposes underlying it, rather than to formalist rules-such as
the Lemon test-designed to implement it. These purposes, I ar-
gue, are those identified by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy and
by such scholars as McConnell and Schwarz, which focus on
prohibiting government from imposing religious choices. Al-
though pushing an individual who suffers from alcoholism or
drug abuse into the arms of A.A. might appear to constitute ex-
actly such an imposition, I would argue that, in light of the cir-
cumstances, and assuming official pressure is not applied beyond
a short period, 297 such pressure should not be deemed to violate
the Establishment Clause.
In order to decide whether the Establishment Clause even ap-
plies to the A.A. cases, however, I must first determine whether
A.A. is a religion at all. That determination begins by deciding
how religion can be recognized.
B. What Is Religion?
Although no definition of religion has emerged as authorita-
tive, several courts have addressed the issue. In United States v.
Seeger, the Supreme Court had to decide whether an agnostic
who opposed war for "religious" reasons was entitled to consci-
entious objector status pursuant to an act of Congress. 298 Al-
though the Seeger Court claimed to refrain from defining relig-
ion, it did set forth a "function" test, according to which a
system of beliefs that functions in place of a belief in God quali-
fies as a religion for purposes of the conscientious objector stat-
ute.299 Thus, the Seeger Court included within the concept of re-
ligion "a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the
life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by ... God."3°
Writing in two cases arising directly under the Religion
Clauses, Judge Arlin Adams of the Third Circuit later molded
the "place parallel" language of Seeger into a three-part inquiry.
His first opinion was a concurrence in Malnak v. Yogi, which in-
volved a claim that Transcendental Meditation (TM) classes
297. After all, apostasy is itself a form of religious conversion. When called before
the Diet of Worms to recant his heresy, for example, Martin Luther declared "Here I
stand, I cannot do otherwise," setting in motion titanic religious changes. See generally
Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation
Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1050 (1996).
298. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
299. See id. at 176.
300. Id.
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taught in a public school violated the Establishment Clause.30 1
The court held that the classes constituted a violation. Agreeing,
Judge Adams noted that TM had three important traits that are
characteristic of religion.3° First, it seeks to answer fundamental
questions about life, death, and the nature of humankind.30 3 Sec-
ond, it attempts to answer these questions comprehensively. In
other words, it does not purport to answer such a question as
"Where did the universe come from?" without addressing other
issues of similar import. 304 Finally, TM has a certain amount of
ritual and ceremony which, although not dispositive, made the
classes look somewhat like a religion.30 5 Because the classes were
offered in a public school, Judge Adams concluded that they
constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause.3 6
In a later majority opinion, Africa v. Pennsylvania,3 7 Judge Ad-
ams used his three-part test to adjudicate the claim of a member
of the radical group MOVE. The member claimed that, for relig-
ious reasons, his prison diet had to consist entirely of raw
meat.308 Finding that MOVE's belief system did not attempt to
answer profound questions, was not comprehensive, and bore
none of the external indicia of religion, Judge Adams character-
ized it as a mere philosophy and rejected Africa's free exercise
claim. 309 In making this last determination, Judge Adams drew
from dictum in the Supreme Court's decision Wisconsin v. Yoder,
in which the Court distinguished between philosophical and re-
ligious matters of conscience. 310
301. 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979).
302. See id. at 207-08 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
303. See id. at 208-09, 213 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
304. Id. at 209, 213-14 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
305. See id. at 209-10, 214 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
306. See id. at 214-15 (Adams, J., concurring in the result).
307. 632 F.2d 1025 (3d. Cir. 1981).
308. See id. at 1025.
309. See id. at 1036.
310. See id. at 1034 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (upholding
Amish parents' claim that requiring their children to attend public school after the
eighth grade interfered with their religion and their way of life, and distinguishing a
"mere philosophy," which would not be entitled to free exercise protection, from
religion).
The D.C. Circuit faced a similar issue in Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in which that court had to decide whether
Scientology was a religion. The court concluded that it was, with reasoning similar to
that of Seeger and the later Adams' opinions. See Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d
at 1160 (noting that Scientology's writings "contain a general account of man and his
nature comparable in scope, if not in content, to those of some recognized religions").
See generally Eric C. Freed, Note, Secular Humanism, the Establishment Clause, and Public Ed-
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Notwithstanding the guidance provided by such decisions as
Seeger, Yoder, Malnak, and Africa, however, courts may never come
up with an authoritative definition of religion. This is in part be-
cause any definition of religion could undermine the purpose of
the Free Exercise Clause which, presumably, is to protect relig-
ion as it is, not as an outside observer would define it. As Angela
Carmella has noted, the state possesses the ultimate authority to
decide what is religious, and therefore not subject to political
regulation, and what is secular.3" Consequently, she contends,
the government-and particularly the courts-bear an important
obligation not to define religion in a way that would deny it the
opportunity to function, grow, and adapt to new situations.
312
Similarly, George Freeman has argued that, because there is no
one "essence" discoverable in every religion, religion cannot be
defined.313 Nevertheless, because the Establishment Clause pro-
hibits the establishment of religion, courts may have no alternative
but to attempt some definition of religion, and perhaps the "pur-
poses and functions" test 314 of Seeger, Malnak, and Africa will have
to do. After all, morphological approaches to tough questions of
identification are standard practice in other fields.315
C. Is A.A. Religion?
Applying either Seeger, Malnak, and Africa, or a general mor-
phological test, I would argue that A.A. bears sufficient resem-
blance to religion to implicate the Establishment Clause. Cer-
tainly the complaints brought by the various plaintiffs in the
cases I will discuss suggest that A.A. struck them as religious.
Like the many self-help programs that it has spawned, A.A. is
based on the "twelve steps of recovery," the first three of which
are as follows:
Step One: We admitted we were powerless over alcohol-that
ucation, 61 N.Y.U. L. RE. 1149, 1167 (1986) (hereinafter Secular Humanism).
311. See Angela C. Carmella, The Religion Clauses and Acculturated Religious Conduct:
Boundaties for the Regulation of Religion, in THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN MONITORING AND
REGULATING RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 24-25, 35 (James E. Wood et al. eds., 1993).
312. See id.
313. George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of
"Religion," 71 GEO. LJ. 1519 (1983).
314. Secular Humanism, supra note 310, at 1167.
315. There is, for instance, the saying that if an animal walks like a duck and talks
like a duck, it probably is a duck.
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our lives had become unmanageable; 316 Step Two:[We c]ame to
believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to
sanity;31" Step Three:[We m]ade a decision to turn our will and
our lives over to the care of God as we understood him.31
Although the first three steps of the program imply a com-
plete syllogism of sorts-that members cannot respond to their
problem alone, that they come to believe that a greater power
can, and that they try to allow that power to do so-the remain-
ing nine steps add to and appear to enhance the syllogism of the
first three. Thus, the fourth through seventh steps involve a
"moral inventory," culminating, in the seventh step, in a request
that God remove personal shortcomings. The eighth through
tenth steps involve making amends to people whom the recover-
ing alcoholic has hurt. The eleventh and twelfth steps involve
continuing moral and spiritual growth. Specifically, the eleventh
step provides that members seek "through prayer and meditation
to improve [their] conscious contact with God as [they under-
stand] Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for [them]
and the power to carry that out. ' 31 9 The twelfth provides that
"[h]aving had a spiritual awakening a result of these steps, [they
try] to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these
principles in all [their] affairs." 320
The nature of A.A. suggests that it comes close enough to be-
ing a religion-even if it is not technically one-to implicate the
Establishment Clause. Although the program does not purport to
answer questions about death, the afterlife, or the origins of the
universe,321 it does offer a set of principles, the steps, designed to
facilitate a new way of life, albeit with sobriety as the overriding
goal. Moreover, it blends religious practices into the steps in
such a thorough manner as to defy dissection. In fact, A.A., like
psychoanalysis, 322 might function more as a facilitator of estab-
316. See TWELvE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADTIONS, supra note 16, at 21.
317. See id. at 25.
318. Id at 34 (emphasis in original).
319. Id. at 96 (emphasis in original).
320. Id. at 106.
321. In fact, A.A. suggests that the recovering alcoholic not worry about such ques-
tions and focus on other matters. See supra note 293.
322. See The Symbolic Life, in JUNG, C.W., supra note 2, at 284-85, 1 671. In the course
of a discussion including several members of the clergy, Jung stated
there is now in Germany ... a liturgical movement; and one of the main
representatives is a man who has a great knowledge of symbolism. He has
given me quite a number of instances, which I am able to check, where he
has translated the figures in dreams into dogmatic language with the great-
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lished religions than as a religion of its own. As one of the writ-
ers of Alcoholics Anonymous, the "Big Book" of the program, wrote
at the conclusion of his story:
I had accepted Catholicism somewhat as an inheritance. My
education had been pretty much pagan-science. I resolved
that if I were going to continue with the Catholic Church, I was
going to know the roots of the doctrine, since those roots had
caused me some confusion. So I enrolled at the university for
night courses in religion, and I pursued those courses for a
year. In summing up, I can say that A.A has made me, I hope,
a real Catholic. 323
Nevertheless, under formalist doctrine, it is doubtful that a
constitutionally material distinction between A.A. and religion
could be predicated on the fact that A.A. acts more as a
facilitator for religious growth than as a religion itself. If this
were a meaningful distinction, the "no aid" principle of Everson
would have to be repudiated.
D. When Does Government 'Establish" A.A?
Some present practices may violate Lemon, which prohibits offi-
cial actions that have the primary effect of promoting religion.
Given the religious nature of A.A., it can be argued persuasively
that the "primary effect" of sending people to A.A. is the promo-
tion of religion. Conversely, if one accepts as persuasive the argu-
ment that the primary effect of official referral to A.A. is a more
sober citizenry, it becomes difficult to argue that outright subsi-
dies to parochial schools-and even churches-would violate the
Constitution, insofar as such institutions help mold a stable,
healthy citizenry.3
24
est success, and these people quietly slipped back into the order of the
[Roman Catholic] Church. They have no right to be neurotic. They belong
to a church, and if you can help them to slip back to the Church you have
helped them.
Id. at 285, 1 671.
323. See ALCOHoLIcs ANoNYMoUs, supra note 263, at 220-21.
324. In fact, Justice O'Connor to some extent condoned such motivations in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, in which, speaking of such official "acknowledgments"
of religion as non-denominational legislative prayers, the declaration of Thanksgiving as
a public holiday, the printing of "In God We Trust" on coins, and the opening of court
sessions with "God save the United States and this honorable court," she argued that
such practices "serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate
secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future,
and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society." See Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692-93 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Notwithstanding the irreconcilability of current practices with
Lemon, however, I would argue, in light of the contextual tests
for the Establishment Clause that I have cited, that government
runs the risk of "establishing" A.A. as a religion and thereby vio-
lating the Establishment Clause only if it requires a person to
participate in the program to the extent that his process of relig-
ious growth is dominated-subdued-by an external authority.
This conclusion resembles the approaches espoused by Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy and also reflects the tests advocated by
Schwarz and McConnell. Although the test is ultimately subjec-
tive, it is not subjective in the sense that each person ordered to
attend meetings may decide for himself whether an establish-
ment has occurred. Instead, a court would ask what a reasonable
person in that person's position would feel. Subjectivity, of
course, would remain with the finder of fact, but appellate courts
could set forth certain general -guidelines, such as the following:
First, whenever A.A. is required, the government should try to
make a more secular program, such as Rational Recovery, an al-
ternative, if possible, assuming such programs demonstrate an
ability to deal with alcohol abuse effectively. Second, the govern-
ment should never require affirmation of the principles of A.A.,
nor should the government require persons referred to A.A. to
do more than attend, listen, and obtain evidence of attendance.
Finally, no person should be assigned to A.A. for a long-term or
permanent basis. If a government adheres to these guidelines,
chances are that any decision by a person, initially referred by
the government to A.A., to participate in the program and to
adopt its principles would constitute an independent, albeit facil-
itated, religious or quasi-religious choice. Moreover, this is the
approach A.A. itself expects. A.A. does not expect people to par-
ticipate in the program upon the insistence of others. Rather, it
is based on a decision by the individual to participate. In fact,
A.A. has taken a similar approach to religious matters, subordi-
nating religious controversy to the primary purpose of achieving
sobriety, but at the same time stressing that progress through the
program, as individuated as it may be, is essentially spiritual.
325
325. See ALCOHOLICS ANONymOUS, supra note 263, at 28.
We think it no concern of ours what religious bodies our members identify
themselves with as individuals. This should be an entirely personal affair
which each one decides for himself in the light of past associations, or his
present choice. Not all of us join religious bodies, but most of us favor
such memberships.
Id.; see also id. at 28-29 ("Many who once were [agnostic] are now among our members.
[Vol. 651162
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
I will now attempt to apply the foregoing approach to non-es-
tablishment to some of the A.A. cases that have been decided.
E. The Cases
1. O'Connor v. California
In O'Connor v. California,326 an individual who, in effect, was re-
quired to attend either A.A. or Rational Recovery as a condition
of his probation for a multiple drunk-driving offense argued that
A.A. was a religious organization and that Rational Recovery was
not a viable option for him because it met rarely in the vicinity
of his home.327 The court concluded that A.A. was religious in
nature, but upheld the condition of his probation, reasoning
that the existence of a secular alternative to A.A., Rational Recov-
ery, eliminated any potential Lemon violation, even though
O'Connor had little meaningful access to this nonreligious alter-
native.3 28 Significantly, the court wrote that "the fact that the
concept of God is incorporated in a program in which the State
encourages participation does not in itself violate the Establish-
ment Clause. More state involvement-whether it is called 'en-
tanglement' or 'endorsement'-is required than has been shown
here."32
9
This decision was essentially correct, although not entirely for
the reasons cited by the court. Sending O'Connor to A.A. indi-
rectly promoted religion, particularly because Rational Recovery,
the secular alternative,330 was not a viable option for O'Connor.
Surprisingly enough, we find such convictions no great obstacle to a spiritual
experience.").
Michael G. Honeymar has written an extensive analysis of A.A. as a condition to
probation and the Establishment Clause. See Honeymar, supra note 287. Although
Honeymar does not challenge current interpretations of the Establishment Clause, he
does suggest that programs that preserve individuals' choice between religious and non-
religious programs may survive judicial review. Id. at 465 (arguing that, if a probationer
has a "meaningful choice," there is no violation, even if he attends A.A., because "it is
the probationer that has made the choice"). Honeymar's suggestions for how to avoid
"mandatory" A.A. are more elaborate than those set forth here. See id. at 465-67. He also
describes a program that California initiated after O'Connor v. California, see infra note
331, that "explicitly categorizes AA as a sectarian organization and requires [counties]
to list nonsectarian self-help groups if it lists sectarian groups such as AA." Honeymar,
supra note 287, at 468.
326. 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
327. See id. at 304-05.
328. See id. at 307-08.
329. See id. at 308.
330. The argument exists that Rational Recovery must be religious if it can accom-
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The court's decision was correct, however, because O'Connor
did not demonstrate that being forced to attend A.A. meetings
was likely to result in an imposition of religion. He only demon-
strated that the government had referred him to A.A. He failed
to demonstrate any actual interference with his religious growth
or decision-making process.
331
2. Stafford v. Harrison
In Stafford v. Harrison,332 an inmate at a state prison in Kansas
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his free-
dom of religion had been violated because he had been required
to participate in a recovery program based on A.A. as a condi-
tion of his incarceration.33 3 The court rejected his claim, holding
that the state had not imposed a religion upon Stafford because
A.A. is not a religion.
33
The Stafford v. Harrison court's decision that A.A. does not at
least implicate religion sufficiently for purposes of the Establish-
ment Clause is unwarranted, given the character of A.A. None-
theless, the court probably came to the correct conclusion on
the facts shown because, again, it does not appear that the state
imposed a religion on Stafford. Like O'Connor, Stafford merely
established that the government pushed him toward A.A. Given
Stafford's imprisonment, however, it is possible that the govern-
ment's actions did tend to overbear Stafford's decision-making
process. Additional facts may show this.
plish the same objectives as A.A. Although this assumes a protean definition of religion,
such a definition may be appropriate. Cf Carmella, supra note 311, at 33 (noting that
the "acculturation process" of churches is "fluid and dynamic because culture and
churches change; the social context, theology, tradition, and social worlds of members
will contribute to each generation's church-culture dialogue [final footnote omitted].").
331. In response to O'Connor, the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Pro-
grams amended the section of the California Administrative Code that governs the pro-
gram pursuant to which O'Connor attended A.A. meetings. See generally Honeymar,
supra note 287, at 468. As amended, the section recognizes A.A. as a "sectarian group"
and requires counties to make both sectarian and nonsectarian alternatives available.
332. 766 F Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991).
333. See id. at 1015.
334. See id. at 1017. In response to Stafford's claim that his own free exercise of re-
ligion had been unconstitutionally infringed, the court decided that the state's policy of
treating alcohol abuse by requiring prisoners to participate in the program was "reason-
ably related to legitimate penological interests." See id. at 1017-18 (citing O'Lone v. Es-
tate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
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3. Youle v. Edgar
Youle requested reinstatement of his driving privileges, which
had been revoked for driving while intoxicated. 335 The Secretary
of State for the State of Illinois, Edgar, denied Youle's request
because Youle refused to participate in a "support system" for
"problem drinkers." The court upheld the requirement that
problem drinkers participate in a support system as reasonable
and, therefore, upheld the Secretary's denial. 336 The court ad-
dressed Youle's argument that being forced to participate in A.A.
was a violation of the Constitution as follows:
Plaintiff attacks the Alcoholics Anonymous support system by
stating it is .a quasi-religious organization, and, therefore, it is a
violation of his constitutional rights to require him to partici-
pate in such an organization. This is meritless. The primary
function of Alcoholics Anonymous is to cope with the disease
of alcoholism. It is a well-recognized support program, in part,
because it achieves a measure of success. Moreover, the Secre-
tary does not require participation in Alcoholics Anonymous,
but in an ongoing support program. Plaintiff offered no alter-
native programs.
3 7
The Youle court's decision seems to have been correct because
Youle had alternatives to A.A. If each of these alternatives were
as religious as A.A., however, the correct decision would have
turned on the amount of official pressure applied on Youle to
conform to the expectations of the program. Here, there might
have been a problem. Youle lost his driving privileges after being
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and subse-
quently of driving with a revoked license. Pursuant to his fourth
application for restored driving privileges, Youle submitted to an
"alcohol evaluation," from which it was determined that he was a
"Level III-Problematic User" of alcohol; therefore, his license
could not be reinstated unless he, among other things, "estab-
lished an ongoing support/recovery program." 33 The hearing of-
ficer noted:
Given Petitioner's denial of being alcoholic despite evidence
classifying him as such, places the Petitioner at risk and war-
rants specific treatment to address that problem. Merely discon-
tinuing the use of alcohol (abstaining) does not necessarily
335. See Youle v. Edgar, 526 N.E.2d 894, 895-96 (Il1. App. Ct. 1988).
336. See id. at 897.
337. See id. at 899.
338. Id. at 897.
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mean a person has attained "sobriety" in the sense that A.A.
and most in the field of alcoholism treatment view sobriety.
When considered in the context of alcoholism, sobriety be-
comes indicative of an attitude or way of thinking-a manner
of living-not simply non-intoxication. Unless and until the al-
coholic has attained such sobriety by truly accepting the prob-
lem, by not drinking, [by] exercising healthy, appropriate be-
havior and by utilizing available resources for continued outside
support, he will feel uncomfortable with not drinking and is in
imminent danger of suffering a relapse.339
If A.A. were the only feasible support group for Youle, or if his
alternatives were also quasi-religious in nature, the State of Illi-
nois's potentially unlimited requirement that he participate in
the program could constitute imposition in violation of the inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause I have advocated.
4. Warner v. Orange County Department of Probation
In late 1990, Warner was ordered to attend A.A. meetings as a
condition of probation after he had been convicted of a third al-
cohol-related driving offense.34° In January 1991, however, he be-
gan complaining about the religious nature of A.A., stating that
he was an atheist and that A.A. was "objectionable" to him.341
Thereafter, Warner's probation officer determined that Warner
was not sufficiently serious about the program. Accordingly, the
probation officer recommended that Warner attend "step meet-
ings" designed to enhance his participation in the program and
engage an A.A. "sponsor."34 2 Some time later, after Warner filed
a motion in state court challenging the requirement that he at-
tend A.A. meetings, the Orange County Department of Proba-
tion (OCDP), the office that had originally recommended his at-
tendance at the meetings, furnished him with an alternative to
A.A. 343 Warner thereafter brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against OCDP, seeking damages and a declaration that defend-
ant had violated the Establishment Clause.3 After a bench trial,
the district court ruled that OCDP had violated the Establish-
339. Id.
340. See Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Probatibn, 115 F.3d 1068, 1069-70 (2d
Cir. 1997).
341. Id. at 1070.
342. Id.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 204-05.
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ment Clause and ordered it to pay plaintiff nominal damages of
one dollar and attorney's fees.3 5
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court in all respects
pertinent here.346 Applying the coercion test of Lee v. Weisman,
the court concluded that A.A. has a "substantial religious compo-
nent" and that OCDP had coerced Warner into participating in
the program by virtue of its recommendation to the sentencing
judge, which, at first, had not included an alternative to A.A.
347
Dissenting, Judge Winter argued, among other things, that
OCDP's recommendation did not violate the Establishment
Clause because it satisfied the Lemon test. He argued that the
recommendation had the secular purpose of rehabilitating
Warner, had only an incidental effect of promoting religion, and
did not foster excessive entanglements. More importantly, he
pointed out that Warner himself had chosen to attend A.A.
meetings before sentencing in order to impress the judge.349
The court's decision in Warner may have been correct, al-
though it is hard to say on the facts given. As Judge Winter
pointed out, the choice to attend A.A. meetings was originally
Warner's. Consequently, it is hard to conclude that the OCDP
imposed religion upon Warner by suggesting that he continue to
attend meetings that he had already chosen to attend. More dif-
ficult questions arise with respect to Warner's subsequent objec-
tions to A.A. and with respect to the OCDP's response to his ob-
jections. The facts related by the Second Circuit do not show the
extent to which the OCDP tried to impose A.A. upon an unwill-
ing probationer after he first complained about the program's
religious character.
350
345. See id. at 205.
346. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether Warner's failure
to object to A.A.'s religious nature when he was sentenced constituted waiver of his
claim. See id. at 1081-82. On remand, the district court found neither waiver nor consent
and adhered to its earlier judgment in favor of Warner. See Warner v. Orange County
Dep't of Probation, 968 F Supp. 917, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
347. Id. at 1075.
348. See id. at 1080-81 (Winter, J., dissenting).
349. See id. at 1078 (Winter, J., dissenting). Judge Winter wrote:
This lawsuit is an instance of remarkable gall. Warner voluntarily selected
and began attendance at A.A. meetings on the advice of counsel in order
to impress the sentencing court .... Now he complains that a subsequent
recommendation of a probation officer that he attend such meetings enti-
ties him to monetary damages.
Id.
350. The facts related by the district court on remand do suggest a fair amount of
tension between the OCDP and Warner after Warner's sentencing. See Warner, 968 F.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Sometimes, religion can be such a good thing that the govern-
ment is realistically forced to-or at least ought to-work with it
rather than despite it. This approach, however, would be difficult
to reconcile with a bright-line rule, such as that of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, that categorically prohibits the government from tak-
ing the positive attributes of religion into account in seeking to
effect good public policy. The alternative to such a bright-line
rule, however, must be a contextual approach, which many have
advocated and which I too advocate, guardedly. One danger with
such an approach, of course, is that it lacks clarity and is not
easy to apply. This is reflected in the examination of the A.A.
cases set forth in Part V. Another danger, and perhaps a far
more serious one, is that, to some extent, the vitality of religion
depends on its privacy. Nevertheless, the question a court must
ask with respect to A.A. is whether official pressure to participate
in such a program will impose a religious belief or practice on a
person 351 or proximately cause him to adopt a practice that he
would not have adopted but for the pressure. 352 I say proximately
because a person who drinks heavily and drives under the influ-
ence of alcohol may undergo a religious or quasi-religious
change because of official pressure to participate in A.A. while
his decision to become actively involved in the program might
be personal. In fact, of course, this is the premise of A.A.353
Supp. at 920-24.
351. See Schwarz, supra note 7, at 693.
352. See McConnell, supra note 7, at 35.
353. The Third Tradition of A.A. provides that: "The only requirement for A.A.
membership is a desire to stop drinking." TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE TRADITIONS, supra
note 16, at 139. Cf id. at 145 ("So the hand of Providence early gave us a sign that any
alcoholic is a member of our Society when he says so.").
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